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INTRODUCTION
For two hundred years, Congress struggled to find an effective
method for deciding and paying disputed claims against the govern1
ment. It sought to retain control over payments made from the public fisc, a responsibility assigned to it by the Appropriations Clause,
but by a method that did not drown its members in administrative detail. Its pursuit of these two contending goals led it to try different
approaches. By the 1960s, the myriad steps taken by Congress resulted in a significant transfer of power that was neither foreseen nor
2
sought. In the subsequent four decades, Congress followed that
same path to the point where it has now ceded almost all authority
over claims payments and greatly reduced its ability to track those expenditures.

1

2

“[A] claim against the United States is well understood [to be] a right to demand money
from the United States . . . which can be presented by the claimant to some department
or officer of the United States for payment, or may be prosecuted in . . . court . . . .”
Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U.S. 567, 575 (1886); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-08-978SP, 3 PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 14-10 (3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW], http://www.gao.
gov/special.pubs/d08978sp.pdf (noting that the Hobbs decision resolved the question of
what is a claim).
See William M. Wiecek, The Origin of the United States Court of Claims, 20 ADMIN. L. REV. 387,
388 (1968) (“This transfer was not a consciously-sought end in itself; it was brought about
by responses to needs of the moment.”).
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The Judgment Fund 3 is the mechanism Congress established to
4
pay most settlements and judgments against the federal government.
The Fund, originally created in 1956 and limited then to paying
judgments of $100,000 or less, was repeatedly expanded until the
current, 1977 version that automatically pays settlements and judg5
ments regardless of amount. It is “a permanent, indefinite appropriation for the satisfaction of judgments, awards, and compromise set6
tlements against the United States.” The Judgment Fund is available
7
only under specific circumstances, but when available it makes pay8
ments without any review by Congress. The government uses it to
9
pay out billions of dollars every year, yet there is no practical way for
10
Congress or the public to track where Judgment Fund money goes.
The Judgment Fund sits at the intersection of two longstanding
policies rooted in the Republic’s foundational documents: legislative
branch authority over the purse and public accounting of government expenditures. The Constitution addresses them both in Clause
7 of Article I, Section 9: “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all
11
public Money shall be published from time to time.” The first half
of Clause 7, the Appropriations Clause, was not much discussed at the
12
Constitutional Convention. The second half of Clause 7, the State-

3
4

5
6
7
8

9

10

11
12

31 U.S.C. § 1304 (2012).
See 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-31 to 1432 (describing the formation of the Judgment Fund); Jeffrey Axelrad, What is the Judgment
Fund?, 1 Ann.2004 ATLA-CLE 435 (2004).
See infra Part I.D.
2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-8.
See infra notes 141-164 and accompanying text.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/OGC-94-33, 3 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
APPROPRIATIONS LAW 14-64 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter 1994 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
APPROPRIATIONS LAW], http://www.gao.gov/assets/200/196723.pdf.
See Jenna Greene, Feds Spent Billions to Resolve Suits in 2012; The Judgment Fund, NAT’L L. J.
(Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202595862822/Inside-theJudgment-Fund?germane=1202595862822&id=1202595810365 (noting that over $4 billion was paid from the Judgment Fund in 2012).
See 1994 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 8, at 12-6 (noting
that no one knows the number of claims processed by the federal government each year);
Jenna Greene, Federal Returns; Records Show Government Paid Billions To Settle Suits Last Year,
34 NAT’L L.J. ( 2012), 1, 1–2 (explaining that the Judgment Fund has “no fiscal year limitations” and describing the enormous range of payments made in 2011).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
See Paul F. Figley & Jay Tidmarsh, The Appropriations Power and Sovereign Immunity, 107
MICH. L. REV. 1207, 1248–52 (2009) (chronicling the history of the Appropriations
Clause); Note, The CIA’s Secret Funding and the Constitution, 84 YALE L.J. 608, 609–11 (1975)
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ment and Accounts Clause, was debated; George Mason’s proposal to
require annual reports of expenditures was opposed by James Madi13
son and rejected.
This Article analyzes why it made sense for Congress to create the
Judgment Fund, why Congress should require better reporting of
payments made, and why it should consider reasserting some control
over huge settlements that, in practical effect, create new government
claims programs. The Article follows two strands: Congress’s desire
to have claims handled by another branch, despite its authority over
appropriations, and the public’s right to know about government expenditures.
This Article in Part I examines the history of federal payment of
claims, the transition from legislative control over that process to creation of the Judgment Fund, and subsequent congressional efforts to
have agencies reimburse the Fund for some categories of payments.
Part II addresses the history of public disclosure of claims payments.
Part III assesses how the Judgment Fund might be exploited and the
problems caused by the lack of transparency of its payments. This
discussion addresses legislative authority to use the Fund for new
purposes that may be inconsistent with its original intent, executive
branch control over its disbursements, and the potential for government attorneys, acting for political or personal reasons, to improperly
help favored claimants by agreeing to unwarranted settlements or by
pulling punches in litigation. This Part examines the latter problem
in the contexts of settlements of single events, “sue and settle” litigation, and class settlements. Part IV proposes improvements for the
Judgment Fund and claims payment practices. It suggests that Congress consider retrieving its authority to require that the appropriations process be used to fund new claims programs, such as the Hispanic or Female Farmer’s Claims Process the Obama Administration,
14
unilaterally established and financed with Judgment Fund money.
Part IV also includes several proposals to make reimbursement processes and claims payments transparent, retrievable, and public.

13

14

[hereinafter Note, Secret Funding] (tracing the history of Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 of
the Constitution).
For more detailed descriptions of the debates surrounding Mason’s proposal, and its ultimate rejection, see Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 154–56 (D.C. Cir. 1980); 2 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 618–19 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed.
1966); Note, Secret Funding, supra note 13, at 609–11.
See infra notes 416–438 and accompanying text.
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES’ PAYMENT OF CLAIMS &
THE CREATION OF THE JUDGMENT FUND
The Appropriations Clause puts the power of the purse—the au15
The
thority to spend public funds—in the hands of Congress.
Clause requires that Congress pass an appropriation before funds can
16
be paid out of the Treasury. The Appropriations Clause directly
pertains to any claim for money damages from the federal govern17
It requires a specific funding source for any government
ment.
18
payment, including settlements and court-ordered judgments.
Agency appropriations cannot be used to pay judgments against the
19
United States or its agencies, absent specific authorizing legislation.
Such legislation could be an appropriation for a particular settlement

15

16

17

18

19

Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO, Local 1647 v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 388 F.3d
405, 408–09 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 425–
27 (1990) and Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321 (1937)); see also
U.S. Dep’t of Navy v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 665 F.3d 1339, 1346 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(“The Appropriations Clause . . . protects Congress’s ‘exclusive power over the federal
purse.’” (citing Rochester Pure Waters Dist. v. EPA, 960 F.2d 180, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1992)));
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 14, at 274–75 (noting
the view among many Framers that “the pursestrings should be in the hands of the Representatives of the people”); Figley & Tidmarsh, supra note 13, at 1253, 1259 (describing
the importance of the legislature having control over the public purse).
Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 428 (1990); Cincinnati Soap Co. v.
United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321 (1937); Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. 272, 291 (1850); see
also Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1357 (1988) (discussing constitutional principles of the public fisc and of appropriations control).
See Figley & Tidmarsh, supra note 13, at 1262–67 (discussing the connection between the
Appropriations Clause and federal sovereign immunity for money damages); see also John
F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 437 n.192
(2010) (“The most plausible textual source for federal sovereign immunity [from money
damages] is the Appropriations Clause . . . .”).
The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that a sovereign state can be sued only
to the extent that it has consented to be sued and that only its legislative branch can give
such consent. See, e.g., United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 610 (1990) (“If any principle
is central to our understanding of sovereign immunity, it is that the power to consent to
such suits is reserved to Congress.”); accord United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309
U.S. 506, 514 (1940) (“Consent alone gives jurisdiction to adjudge against a sovereign.”).
Richmond, 496 U.S. at 432 (“[F]unds may be paid out only on the basis of a judgment
based on a substantive right to compensation based on the express terms of a specific
statute.”); 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-30
to 14-32 (noting that the Appropriations Clause “applies with equal force to payments directed by a court” and citing to Richmond, 496 U.S. at 424–26).
2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-29 to 14-44;
see also Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181, 2194 n.9 (2012) (noting that
the Appropriations Clause does not bar recovery where a specific statute establishes a
right to compensation from the Judgment Fund); Cnty. of Suffolk v. Sebelius, 605 F.3d
135, 143 (2d Cir. 2010) (observing that the legal basis for an award under the Judgment
Fund must be found elsewhere in the law).
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or judgment, a general appropriation for categories of settlements or
judgments, or a statute that authorizes payments from a pre-existing
20
appropriation. If Congress chose not to appropriate money to pay a
21
Accordingly, until
judgment, the judgment would not be paid.
Congress had enacted an applicable waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity, the federal government could not be sued for dam22
ages.
A. The Period of Administrative-Legislative Resolution of Claims
The absence of an applicable waiver of sovereign immunity in the
23
early Republic did not leave citizens without a remedy. The First
Amendment gave each citizen the right “to petition the Government
24
for a redress of grievances.” Individuals used that right to seek private legislation granting them financial remedies for claims against
25
the government. From the outset, Congress directly resolved individual claims with legislation. The first such bill was passed in Sep26
tember of 1789. More than 700 petitions were presented to the First
27
28
Congress. Congress organized itself to process such claims. In

20

21

22

23

24
25

26
27

2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-31 to 14-32;
see also Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., 388 F.3d at 409 (discussing the different forms congressional appropriations can take).
See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 570 (1962) (recognizing a 1933 study that found
fifteen instances in seventy years in which Congress did not appropriate money to pay a
judgment); 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 1431 (citing Glidden).
United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (“Thus, except as Congress has consented to a cause of action against the United States, ‘there is no jurisdiction . . . in
any . . . court to entertain suits against the United States.’” (quoting United States v.
Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 587–88 (1941)); United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. 286, 288
(1846) (“[T]he government is not liable to be sued, except with its own consent, given by
law.”).
The Judiciary Act of 1789 did not waive sovereign immunity. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19
U.S. 264, 411–12 (1821) (“The universally received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or prosecuted against the United States; that the judiciary act does not authorize
such suits.”).
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Bills to Provide for the Adjustment of Certain Tort Claims Against the United States: Hearings on
H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong. 24–25 (1942)
[hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463] (statement of Assistant Att’y Gen.
Francis M. Shea); see also James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private
Bills: Indemnification and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1862, 1889–92 (2010) (discussing the common nature and ease of petitioning for private
payments).
See Floyd D. Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the United States: The Evolution from a
Legislative Toward a Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L. REV. 625, 638 (1985).
Id.
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1794, the House established the Committee on Claims and later es29
tablished other committees for specific categories of claims. The
30
Senate did likewise.
Congress did try other mechanisms for resolving claims. Beginning in 1784, the Confederation Congress had used a three-member
Board of Treasury to hear claims against the national government
31
and report back to Congress. Maintaining a tight rein on the Board
and each claim, the Confederation Congress kept control over pay32
When the Constitution was ratified in 1789, Congress
ments.
33
adopted a similar approach. It established commissions and auditors to evaluate claims, but retained the authority to decide whether
34
and how much to pay. The statute that established the Department
of the Treasury provided for Treasury auditors to receive and examine claims, and then forward them to the Comptroller for final deci35
sion. The congressional committee system and the Treasury Department system complemented one another, with Treasury handling
routine contract matters while Congress dealt with non-contract mat36
Undisputed claims
ters and appeals of Treasury determinations.
37
could be paid promptly. The only recourse for those whose claims
38
were denied was to petition Congress for relief.
28

29
30
31
32
33
34

35

36
37

Both the Continental Congress and the Congress of the Confederation established congressional committees to deal with claims. See 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-3 to 14-4.
See Shimomura , supra note 26, at 644 (citing 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 883 (1794), H.R. REP.
NO. 730, at 2–3)).
Wiecek, supra note 2, at 392.
27 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 469–71 (G. Hunt ed., 1928).
See Shimomura, supra note 26, at 634–35 (describing how the Confederation controlled
the Board “at almost every point”).
See 2 WILSON COWEN ET AL., THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS: A HISTORY, PART II:
ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT, JURISDICTION, 1855–1978, at 2, 4 (1978).
See Wiecek, supra note 2, at 388 (characterizing this as the “executive-administrative
phase”); see also Shimomura, supra note 26, at 635–37 (noting that this approach was consistent with the prior practice of most colonial legislatures).
See Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 5, 1 Stat. 65, 66–67 (“[I]t shall be the duty of the Auditor
to receive all public accounts, and after examination to certify the balance, and transmit
accounts with the vouchers and certificate to the Comptroller for his decision thereon . . . .”); COWEN, supra note 33, at 4 (“The exact role of the Treasury in processing the
claims is unclear and was unclear even at the time.”); Wiecek, supra note 2, at 389 (explaining that section 5 of the act establishing the Treasury Department instructed its Auditor to receive all claims and forward them to the Comptroller); see also Act of Mar. 3,
1817, ch. 45, § 2, 3 Stat. 366, 366 (setting forth procedures for the “prompt settlement of
public accounts”).
See Shimomura, supra note 26, at 644–45 (describing the “two general but separate claims
systems” operated by Congress and the Treasury Department).
See Charles C. Binney, Origin and Development of Legal Recourse Against the Government in the
United States, 57 U. PA. L. REV. 372, 378 (1909) (“As soon as the Treasury Department was
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Congress tried different administrative approaches for handling
disputed claims. A 1792 statute pertaining to claims for Revolutionary War pensions called upon circuit courts to consider evidence,
reach conclusions, and forward them “to the Secretary of War, to39
gether with their opinion in writing….” The statute further provided that if the Secretary suspected a mistake, he was to withhold pay40
ment and report the matter to Congress. The question of whether
Congress could require judicial officers to make such advisory opin41
ions reached the Supreme Court in Hayburn’s Case, but before an
opinion was rendered, Congress amended the statute to require the
42
courts to only take evidence and forward it to the Secretary of War.
An 1816 statute for property claims arising from the War of 1812
provided for the appointment of a single commissioner whose decisions in favor of claimants were final and binding on the govern43
ment. The commissioner was so generous in his awards that President James Madison suspended the commission’s proceedings until
44
Congress could reconsider the grant of authority. Congress amended the statute to require review by the Secretary of War for all awards
45
over $200. The problems raised by this profligate commissioner ad-

38
39
40

41
42
43

44

45

established, the accounting officers were daily occupied in paying what the government
owed for contracts of all kinds.”).
See Wiecek, supra note 2, at 389 (“If a claimant was dissatisfied with the decision of the
Comptroller, his only recourse was to petition Congress.”).
Act of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 243, 244.
Id. § 4 (“[W]here the said Secretary shall have cause to suspect imposition or mistake, he
shall have power to withhold the name of such applicant from the pension list, and make
report of the same to Congress.”); see also COWEN, supra note 33, at 5 n.10 (discussing the
statute in depth).
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
Act of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. 17, 1 Stat. 243; see also Shimomura, supra note 26, at 639 (noting
that this change apparently resolved the advisory opinion problem).
See Act of Apr. 9, 1816, ch. 40, § 14, 3 Stat. 261, 264 (“And when such judgment shall be
in favour of such claim, shall entitle the claimant, or his legal representative, upon the
production of a copy of such judgment . . . to payment of the amount thereof at the
treasury of the United States.”).
30 ANNALS OF CONG. 20 (1816); see also COWEN, supra note 33, at 7 (explaining that President Madison not only suspended these functions but asked Congress to “more clearly
define the scope of [the special commissioner’s] duties under the Act”); Wiecek, supra
note 2, at 389–90 (noting that President Madison suspended the commissioner’s “functions after less than a year of operations”).
Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 110, § 5, 3 Stat. 397 (“[A]ll claims allowed by said commissioner,
of two hundred dollars or upwards, shall be revised by the Secretary of War . . . and may
be confirmed or rejected.”); see also COWEN, supra note 33, at 7 (discussing changes to the
1816 Act in detail).
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versely influenced Congress’s willingness to grant other tribunals the
46
authority to make binding judgments on disputed claims.
Initially, claims payments were made from general appropria47
As Congress increasingly specified the permissible uses of
tions.
particular appropriations, claims that had been approved but did not
fall within those specifications could not be paid until a suitable ap48
propriation was made. Accordingly, parties whose claims had been
49
approved might not be paid for some time.
From the 1820s to 1855, claims were resolved principally through
50
the congressional claims process. Initially, the system seemed to
51
function adequately, but dissatisfaction grew in Congress because of
the legislative time spent on claims and the poor results that were obtained. In 1832, John Quincy Adams argued that deciding private
claims “is judicial business, and legislative assemblies ought to have
52
nothing to do with it.” In 1838, the House Committee on Claims is53
sued a report on the congressional claims system. It noted that the
first three Congresses received 2,317 petitions, while the three Congresses immediately preceding the report received 14,602 petitions,
54
of which only 5,891 were “[a]cted on” at all, and only 603 “[p]assed
55
both Houses.” The committee recognized that claims were delayed
56
and lingered from one session to another.

46

47
48

49
50

51
52

53
54
55
56

See COWEN, supra note 33, at 7–8 (“Experience with the commissioner under the 1816 Act
may have affected the thinking of members of Congress for many years on the wisdom of
delegating final authority to make awards.”); see also Wiecek, supra note 2, at 390 (detailing the reluctance of Congress to “part with control over the federal purse-strings”).
See 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-5.
See id. at 14-6 (“[I]t was possible for Congress to refuse to appropriate the funds for a given judgment, leaving the judgment creditor with a valid entitlement against the United
States but no funds legally available to satisfy it.”).
See id.
See COWEN, supra note 33, at 8 (noting that after 1817, Congress considered many claims
independent of the Treasury Department); Wiecek, supra note 2, at 388 (characterizing
this period, beginning in the 1820s, as the “legislative phase”).
See Wiecek, supra note 2, at 392 (noting that there was “no widespread agitation for a reform of claims procedures”).
8 JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, Entry of Feb. 23, 1832, in MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS,
COMPRISING PORTIONS OF HIS DIARY FROM 1795 TO 1848, at 480 (Charles Francis Adams
ed., 1876) (“One-half of the time of Congress is consumed by [private bills], and there is
no common rule of justice for any two of the cases decided. A deliberative assembly is the
worst of all tribunals for the administration of justice.”).
H.R. REP. NO. 730 (1838).
Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 5.
See id. at 8 (“Claimants and agents persevere in renewing their applications, year after
year, until the loss of time and expenses absorb the entire amount of a small claim.”).
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In 1848, the House Committee on Claims issued another report
on the claims system, updating the statistics from the 1838 report:
“[D]uring the ten years embraced in these five Congresses, out of
16,573 petitions of private claimants to the House of Representatives,
and 3,436 bills reported, only 1,796 passed the House, and but 910
57
passed both Houses.” The 1848 report noted other problems including, inter alia, unjust delays, ex parte testimony, gaming of the
committee system to find a favorable forum, and manipulation to
58
It com“procure passage of claims having no merit whatever.”
plained that private claims consumed one third of the time of the
59
House of Representatives.
In the early 1850s, the scent of scandal increased the momentum
for change. Claims were jumbled and confused; Congress paid one
60
$7000 claim twice. Congressmen degraded their office by acting as
61
claims representatives. The potential for bribery was real and ever62
present. In December of 1854, Senator Richard Brodhead, speaking in favor of a bill to create a board of commissioners to decide private claims, summarized problems of the old system, including: the
postponement of “honest claims”; the expenditure of time; the difficulties of a legislative body deciding “facts of a case”; the constant
pressure from “private claimants, and their agents or attorneys”; and
the unseemliness of “private claims [being] either passed or pressed
into the appropriation bills the last nights of our sessions, contrary to
63
the rules of the Senate, and injurious to the character of Congress.”

57
58
59
60
61

62

63

H.R. REP. NO. 498, at 4 (1848).
Id. at 5–6.
See id. at 6–7.
See CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1854) (statement of Sen. John M. Clayton) (describing the twice-paid claim); COWEN, supra note 33, at 12 (same).
See CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. 308 (1849) (statement of Rep. Andrew Johnson)
(complaining of “notices which . . . even members of Congress had put in the newspapers, proposing to prosecute claims against the Government of the United States”); see also Wiecek, supra note 2, at 395 (“Government officials, including Senators and Congressmen themselves, became part-time claims representatives.”).
See CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 1st Sess. 2100 (1852) (noting the unanimous consent given
to the appointment of a Senate committee “to inquire into abuses, bribery, or fraud, in
the prosecution of claims before Congress”); COWEN, supra note 33, at 12–13 (describing
“an atmosphere that was ripe for scandal”); Wiecek, supra note 2, at 395 (explaining that
the potential problem of bribery of lawmakers was openly discussed).
CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1854) (statement of Sen. Brodhead).
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B. The Court of Claims
Finally, in 1855 Congress acted. It passed the Court of Claims
Act, 64 marking the first step towards a system in which claims would
65
be heard by judges. The original Court of Claims was empowered
to: hear claims based on federal laws, regulations, or contracts;
66
promulgate its own rules; issue subpoenas; and take evidence. The
statute provided that government attorneys defend the United States
67
The court
and that both parties could cross-examine witnesses.
lacked authority to enter final judgments; instead, it forwarded re68
Money to pay
ports and draft bills to Congress for enactment.
69
claims came from enactment of specific bills.
When it received the first reports from the Court of Claims, the
House debated whether to deal with them as final judgments ready to
be paid, or as proposals to be sent to the various claims committees
70
for extensive review. It chose to send them to the committees, effec71
tively treating the new court as an advisory board. This decision destroyed the effectiveness of the Court of Claims and gave new life to
72
the legislative claims system. Claimants who lost in the court ap64
65

66
67
68

69

70

71
72

Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612 (repealed 1982).
See COWEN, supra note 33, at 20 (describing the 1855 Act as just the “beginning”);
Shimomura, supra note 26, at 652 (detailing the framework and powers of the new tribunal).
See Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, §§ 1, 3, 10 Stat. 612, 618 (outlining the powers and responsibilities of the new tribunal).
See id. §§ 2, 5 (authorizing a solicitor to represent the government and providing parties
an opportunity to cross-examine).
Id. §§ 7–9. The decision to deny the court authority to render final judgment was closely
contested. See Shimomura, supra note 26, at 650–52 (discussing the legislative proposals
and debates that aimed to relieve Congress of the inundation of claims).
See Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, §§ 7–9, 10 Stat. 612, 613–14 (establishing procedures for
the Court of Claims to submit reports and draft bills to Congress); see also Slattery v. United States, 635 F.3d 1298, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Any payment to the claimant was implemented by specific legislative enactment.”).
See CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 607, 607–10, 970–73, 1241–49 (1856) (debating
whether Court of Claims judgments should be final or closely reviewed by Congress).
Congressman Houston stated the issue succinctly:
If it be intended that we are simply to carry out the judgment of the Court of
Claims in every case, we might as well pass the bills without referring them anywhere. If, however, our purpose is to make an examination of the cases ourselves . . . it ought to take the usual course . . . [and] go, as in other cases, to one of
the standing committees . . . whose appropriate duty and business it is to make
that particular examination.
Id. at 607.
Shimomura, supra note 26, at 653; Wiecek, supra note 2, at 397.
See Wiecek, supra note 2, at 398 (describing congressional review of Court of Claims decisions); see also Shimomura, supra note 26, at 653 (explaining the consequences of treating
Court of Claims decisions as advisory).
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pealed to Congress; claimants who won had to await an appropria73
Intion, and Congress closely examined pro-claimant decisions.
deed, Court of Claims judgments from 1855 to 1860 totaled $529,000,
74
but by 1860 Congress had paid only half that amount.
75
The inequities and delays of the old, legislative system persisted.
In 1857, three members of the House were caught up in claims and
76
bribery scandals. The number of claims increased dramatically with
77
the coming of the Civil War. In his first inaugural address, President Abraham Lincoln recognized that the claims system was bro78
ken. With the goal of freeing Congress’s time so that it could deal
with broader questions, he urged that the Court of Claims be granted
authority to make final judgments:
[I]t is apparent that the attention of Congress will be more than usually
engaged, for some time to come, with great national questions. It was intended, by the organization of the Court of Claims, mainly to remove this
branch of business from the halls of Congress; but while the court has
proved to be an effective and valuable means of investigation, it in great
degree fails to effect the object of its creation for want of power to make
79
its judgments final.

Both houses of Congress promptly considered but did not enact bills
80
that would make claims judgments final. In 1862, the overwhelming
81
number of war claims led them to renew their efforts.
President Lincoln’s recommendation that claims be adjudicated
82
by the judiciary was adopted when Congress passed the Amended
73
74
75

76
77
78

79
80
81

See Wiecek, supra note 2, at 398 (“Adverse decisions of the court were usually accepted by
Congress, but favorable decisions were debated.”).
Shimomura, supra note 26, at 653.
See H.R. REP. NO. 513, at 1–3, 7 (1860) (urging that claims be decided by the district
courts); Shimomura, supra note 26, at 653 (noting that “all the old problems reappeared”); Wiecek, supra note 2, at 398 (discussing deficiencies of the claims system in the
1850s).
Wiecek, supra note 2, at 398.
See COWEN, supra note 33, at 21 (recognizing the “extraordinarily large number of war
claims”).
President Lincoln said that
[i]t is important that some more convenient means should be provided, if possible,
for the adjustment of claims against the government, especially in view of their increased number by reason of the war. It is as much the duty of government to render prompt justice against itself, in favor of citizens, as it is to administer the same
between private individuals. The investigation and adjudication of claims in their
nature belong to the judicial department.
Wiecek, supra note 2, at 398.
Id. at 398–99.
Id. at 399; see also COWEN, supra note 33, at 21 (noting in particular that the “Senate was
closely divided on the finality issue”).
See Wiecek, supra note 2, at 399 (“Pressures for the establishment of a court mounted as
the war claims poured in.”).
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Court of Claims Act of 1863. 83 This statute gave the Court of Claims
authority to enter final judgments, subject to a right of appeal to the
84
Supreme Court. It expanded the court’s jurisdiction over claims
based on federal laws, regulations, or contracts to also include set-offs
85
and counterclaims. The statute prohibited members of Congress
86
from representing claimants before the court. It also addressed the
source of payments of final judgments, stating that they “be paid out
of any general appropriation made by law for the payment and satis87
faction of private claims.” Accordingly, individual judgments could
88
be paid without the need for a case-specific appropriation. Congress made periodic appropriations to pay those judgments, begin89
ning in 1864.
The jurisdiction of the Court of Claims over claims based on federal laws, regulations, or contracts remained substantially the same

82
83
84
85
86
87
88

89

Id. at 398–99.
Amended Court of Claims Act of 1863, Ch. 92, 12 Stat. 765.
Id. §§ 3, 5, 12 Stat. at 765–66.
Id. § 3, 12 Stat. at 765.
Id. § 4, 12 Stat. at 766.
Id. § 7, 12 Stat. at 766.
See Slattery, 635 F.3d at 1302 (“This provision . . . removed the need for a special congressional appropriation to pay each individual judgment.” (citing Shimomura, supra note
26, at 652–53)). A last-minute amendment briefly undermined the finality of Court of
Claims judgments by barring the payment of a claim until “after an appropriation therefor shall be estimated for by the Secretary of the Treasury.” Act of Mar. 8, 1868, ch. 92, §
14, 12 Stat. 765, 768 . Section 14 was repealed after the Supreme Court dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction the first appeal of a Court of Claims decision in Gordon v. United States, 69
U.S. 561 (1864). No written opinion was issued with the Court’s judgment, an oddity explained by a lost opinion and the death of a Chief Justice. See United States v. Jones, 119
U.S. 477, 478 (1886) (explaining that the delay in publishing Gordon was due, in part, to
Chief Justice Roger Taney’s passing); Wiecek, supra note 2, at 401–03 (noting that “Taney
died before the December term” of 1864). For our purposes, the key fact is that when he
announced the Gordon judgment on March 10, 1865, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase stated, “We think that the authority given to the head of an Executive Department by necessary implication in [Section 14] to revise all the decisions of that court requiring payment
of money, denies to it the judicial power, from the exercise of which alone appeals can be
taken to this court.” Jones, 119 U.S. at 478. A year after the Gordon decision, Congress repealed Section 14. Act of March 17, 1866, ch. 19, § 1 , 14 Stat. 9; see also Gordon, 69 U.S. at
561 (holding that the Supreme Court has no appellate jurisdiction over Court of Claims
decisions); Wiecek, supra note 2, at 403–04 (noting that, according to Congressman
Lyman Trumbull, “[t]he sole object of this bill is to remove this obstacle [§ 14] to taking
appeals to the Supreme Court”).
See Act of June 25, 1864, ch. 147, 13 Stat. 145, 148 (appropriating $300,000 to create a
fund for the payment of Court of Claims judgments “rendered” in the next year); see also
Slattery, 635 F.3d at 1303–04 (“Following the 1863 enactment, Congress made periodic
general appropriations for payment of the judgments of the Court of Claims.”);
Shimomura, supra note 26, at 686–87 (“Congress chose to appropriate funds annually on
a lump sum basis.”).
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until 1887. 90 Congress continued to use the legislative claims system
to resolve other claims, principally for takings under the Fifth
91
Amendment and torts. For those claims the problems of the legislative system persisted—the mass of private claims consumed Congress’s time and attention, meritorious claims were delayed or left
92
unresolved, and little was accomplished.
In 1887, Congress enacted the Tucker Act, which expanded the
Court of Claims’s jurisdiction to also include “claims founded upon
the Constitution . . . or for damages . . . in [non-tort] cases . . . [for]
which claims the party would be entitled to redress against the United
States either in a court of law, equity, or admiralty if the United States
93
were suable….” A key purpose of the act was to remove congressional responsibility for deciding “a large mass of private claims which
were encumbering our business and preventing our discharging our
94
duties….” With its expanded jurisdiction, the Court of Claims had
new responsibility for cases arising from admiralty contracts, tax re95
funds, takings, and pay disputes. Judgments adverse to the United
96
States were reported to Congress which appropriated funds to pay
97
them. Later statutes reinforced the practice of appropriating for
98
specific judgments.

90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98

See Shimomura, supra note 26, at 663 (discussing statutes that fine-tuned the jurisdiction
of the Court of Claims).
Id. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that private property shall not “be
taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
H.R. REP. NO. 49-1077, at 4 (1886).
Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, §1, 24 Stat. 505, 505.
See 18 CONG. REC. 2678 (1887) (statement of Rep. Tucker).
See COWEN, supra note 33, at 43–51 (listing and describing these new areas of jurisdiction).
Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, § 11, 24 Stat. 505, 507.
See Shimomura, supra note 26, at 661 (noting that from 1876 to 1894, Congress typically
appropriated funds to pay specific judgments).
1994 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 8, at 14-6. A 1904
statute required all judgments against the United States to be “transmitted to Congress
through the Treasury Department” in the same fashion as other estimates for appropriation. Act of Apr. 27, 1904, Pub. L. No. 58-189, 33 Stat. 394, 422. In 1950, this provision
was repealed as part of the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950, Pub. L. No.
81-784, § 301(3), 64 Stat. 832, 839. Because the new statute required the president to
submit a budget to Congress, it did not alter the requirement that Congress appropriate
funds to pay judgments. 1994 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra
note 8, at 14-6.
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C. The Federal Tort Claims Act
One large category of claims remained largely in congressional
hands for another six decades—tort claims against the government.99
Using the legislative claims system to decide individual tort claims involved the same problems that arose with contract and taking
100
101
The procedures were unfair.
The legislative branch reclaims.
102
As one congressmained unsuited for deciding individual claims.
man observed, the legislative claims system “ma[d]e justice for the
103
individual a matter of political favor instead of independent right.”
The process wasted a great deal of congressional time for very poor
104
Only a small proportion of the claims were successful: in
results.
the 68th Congress, 250 of 2,200 private bills became law; in the 76th
105
Congress, 315 of 1,763 did.
For decades Congress debated various proposals for a broad tort
106
Echoing President Lincoln’s call for Congress to rid itclaims act.
99

100
101

102

103
104

105

106

Prior to passing the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946, Congress had enacted several statutes to allow tort suits against the government in specific situations, such as admiralty disputes and Post Office negligence. See Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 25,
at 25, 38–39, 47–48 (listing statutes).
See id. at 49–55 (collecting comments dating from 1832 to 1940 by congressmen criticizing the legislative system for deciding tort claims against the government).
Id. In 1926, Massachusetts Congressman Charles L. Underhill explained, “The power
vested in the chairman of the Committee on Claims is tremendous and absolutely wrong.
I can either refuse arbitrarily to consider your claim or I can take up each and every one
of your claims to suit my convenience.” Id. at 52; accord id. at 54 (noting, in a 1940 statement made by Rep. Robinson, the waste of time and inequity caused by the procedures
for bringing a claim against the government).
See id. at 37 (noting that “the judgment of the past two decades has shown [the legislative
claims procedures] to be inadequate, burdensome, and unproductive of substantial justice in many cases”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 79-1287, at 2 (1945) (“[I]t does not afford a
well-defined continually operating machinery for the consideration of such claims.”).
Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 25, at 54 (1940 statement of Rep. Vorys).
See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 79-1400, at 30–31 (1946) (discussing the tediousness of sorting
through individual claims and the small likelihood of success for such claims); H.R. REP.
NO. 79-1287, at 2 (1945) (describing the criticism of the claims system as “being unduly
burdensome to the Congress” and “unjust to the claimants”); Hearings on H.R. 5373 and
H.R. 6463, supra note 25, at 49–55 (compiling criticisms by congressmen of the existing
procedures to obtain relief for private claims).
Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 25, at 56; see also H.R. DOC. NO. 77-562,
at 1 (1942) (noting, in a message from President Roosevelt, that less than 20% of private
claims bills in the 74th, 75th, and 76th Congresses became law); H.R. REP. NO. 79-1287, at
2 (1945) (listing the proportion of successful private claims bills in various congresses).
See generally Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 25, at 40–41 (discussing the
introduction of various legislative remedies in previous decades); LESTER S. JAYSON &
ROBERT C. LONGSTRETH, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS §§ 2.09–2.10 (2013) (describing tort recovery options and limitations before and after the enactment of the FTCA).
Congress had previously passed a myriad of statutes that provided remedies for torts
arising in particular circumstances. See id. § 2.05 (describing twenty-four such statutes).
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self of private claims so it could deal with “great national questions”
107
pertaining to the Civil War, when the United States entered World
War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt urged passage of a general
tort claims act so that Congress and the executive branch would not
be diverted from more important matters that confronted the na108
tion. Finally, in 1946 Congress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act
109
(“FTCA”) as Title IV of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.
The FTCA is a general waiver of the United States’ sovereign im110
It gives federal district courts submunity for suits sounding tort.
ject matter jurisdiction over tort claims arising from negligent or
111
It is a limited waiver of soverwrongful acts of federal employees.
eign immunity, subject to jurisdictional limits and affirmative defens112
es, but on the whole it succeeds at providing reasonable compensation for persons injured by run-of-the-mill negligence of federal
113
Title I of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946
employees.
prohibited private relief bills for claims that might be brought under
the FTCA, effectively relieving Congress of its legislative claims sys114
tem.
As originally passed, the FTCA provided that its judgments be
paid under the same procedure as the Tucker Act, by enactment of a

107

108

109
110
111
112

113

114

These ranged from statutes of very limited scope, such as protecting oyster growers (Act
of Aug. 30, 1935, ch. 831, 49 Stat. 1028, 1049) or persons damaged by Lighthouse Service
vessels (Act of June 17, 1910, ch. 301, 36 Stat. 534, 537), to those of broad application,
such as the Federal Employees Compensation Act (Act of Sept. 7, 1916, ch. 458, 39 Stat.
742) and the Suits in Admiralty Act (Act of Mar. 9, 1920, ch. 95, 41 Stat. 525).
Wiecek, supra note 2, at 399 (citing MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS (James D.
Richardson ed., 1902)); see also supra note 78 and accompanying text (recognizing problems with the claims system in place at the time).
See H.R. DOC. NO. 77-562, at 1 (1942) (“In these critical days of our national-defense effort, I feel there should be a joint endeavor on the part of the Congress and . . . the executive branch . . . to divest our minds as far as possible of matters of lesser importance
which consume considerable time and effort.”).
Fed. Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812 (1946) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2012).
Id.
See, e.g., id. (granting subject matter jurisdiction in limited circumstances); id. § 2675(a)
(establishing the administrative claims procedure); id. § 2680 (listing exceptions to the
FTCA’s general waiver of sovereign immunity).
See JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 106, § 3.01 (noting that a primary purpose of the
FTCA was “to do justice to those who had suffered injuries or losses through the wrongs
of government employees”).
See Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, § 131, 60 Stat. 831 (“No
private bill . . . for personal injuries or death for which suit may be instituted under the
Federal Tort Claims Act . . . shall be received or considered in either the Senate or the
House of Representatives.”).
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specific appropriation. 115 A different procedure was used for payments of settlements. Initially, the FTCA provided that administrative
settlements made by agencies and all settlements made by the Attorney General of cases in litigation were to be paid by the head of the
116
relevant agency from “appropriations that may be made therefor.”
117
To reCongress duly appropriated funds to pay such settlements.
move the bureaucratic burden of continually enacting appropriations
bills to pay settlements, Congress amended the FTCA in 1950 to allow
payment of administrative settlements from “appropriations available
118
to such agency.”
D. Creation of the Judgment Fund
As the number of judgments requiring congressional approval increased in the 1950s, so did the burden on the executive and legislative branches of going through the routine process of preparing, ex119
The delays in
plaining, and enacting the necessary legislation.
awaiting congressional approval of legislation to pay court judgments
increased interest charges and caused consternation for successful
120
To address these problems, in 1953 the General Acplaintiffs.
counting Office recommended the establishment of a permanent,

115
116

117

118
119

120

Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, § 411, 60 Stat. at 844; 1994 GAO PRINCIPLES OF
FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 8, at 14-51 to 14-52.
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, § 403(c), 60 Stat. at 812. At that time $1,000 was
the limit of agency authority for administrative settlements under the FTCA. Id. § 403(a).
That amount was raised to $2,500 in 1959. Act of Sept. 8, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-238, 73
Stat. 471. Claims in excess of the prescribed amount had to be brought in federal district
court. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, § 410, 60 Stat. at 812.
See, e.g., Treasury and Post Office Dep’ts Appropriation Act, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-147, ch.
186, 61 Stat. 216 (1947); Navy Dep’t Appropriation Act, 1948, Pub. L. No. 202, ch. 268, 61
Stat. 382, 383 (1947); Dep’ts of State, Justice, Commerce, and the Judiciary Appropriation
Act, 1948, Pub. L. No. 166, ch. 211, 61 Stat. 279, 289, 294, 302 (1947).
See Act of Sept. 23, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-830, § 9, 64 Stat. 985, 987 (1950); H.R. REP. NO.
81-2984, at 9–10 (1950).
See H.R. REP. NO. 84-2638, ch. 13, at 72 (1956) (recognizing the bill would reduce interest payments); Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 84th Cong.
884–85, 889 (1956) (noting that processing appropriation requests took unnecessary time
from executive and legislative resources, delayed payments, and increased interest costs);
2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-31 (elaborating on the burdensome process of allocating resources to process appropriations).
See H.R. REP. NO. 84-2638, ch. 13, at 72 (1956) (recognizing that creation of the Judgment Fund would simplify payments and reduce interest payments); Hearings Before the
Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 84th Cong. 885, 888–89 (1956) (explaining
that the delay between the award of a final judgment and congressional enactment of an
appropriation bill to pay it caused annoyance to claimants).
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indefinite appropriation for the payment of judgments. 121 In 1956
Congress acted on that recommendation by creating the Judgment
Fund—an open-ended, permanent appropriation for the payment of
judgments of district courts and the Court of Claims that did not ex122
Congress expected that ninety-eight percent of
ceed $100,000.
123
judgments would fall within that limit. Under the new procedure,
judgments for that amount or less were paid automatically, without
124
the need for legislation. Use of the Judgment Fund successfully reduced the administrative burden, interest charges on judgments
against the government, and “the irritations inevitably associated with
125
the delays occasioned by the former method of payment.”
126
In 1961, in view of the success of the 1956 statute, Congress expanded the scope of the Judgment Fund so that it could be used to
pay settlements of claims in circumstances where it would pay final
127
The revised statute stated, “[e]xcept as otherwise projudgments.
vided by law, compromise settlements . . . made by the Attorney General [or his designee] . . . shall be settled and paid in a manner simi-

121

122

123
124

125
126
127

See H. REP. NO. 84-2638, ch. 13, at 72; Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 84th Cong. 883–88 (1956) (discussing the Administration’s “Proposal to Expedite the Payment of Judgments against the United States”); 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF
FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-31 (providing background to the decision to establish a permanent fund for payment of judgments). The 1953 proposal was
rejected because it provided for the Comptroller General to identify for Congress specific
judgments that should not be paid. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 84th Cong. 885, 888 (1956).
Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 84-814, § 1302, 70 Stat. 678, 694–95
(1956). The statute provided, inter alia:
There are appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, and out of the postal revenues, respectively, such sums as may hereafter
be necessary for the payment, not otherwise provide for, as certified by the Comptroller General, of judgments (not in excess of $100,000 in any one case) rendered
by the district courts and the Court of Claims against the United States which have
become final, together with such interest and costs as may be specified in such
judgments or otherwise authorized by law.
Id.
H.R. REP. NO. 84-2638, ch. 13, at 72; Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 84th Cong. 884–88 (1956).
See S. REP. NO. 87-733, at 2439 (1961) (noting that before 1956, a “large percentage of the
judgments rendered against the United States were payable only upon enactment of specific appropriations legislation”); H.R. REP. NO. 87-428, at 3 (1961) (explaining how this
method of payment would help the United States with both foreign policy and interest
charges).
S. REP. NO. 87-733, at 2 (1961).
Id. at 2–4, 9 (describing the benefits received by the United States from the enactment of
the 1956 statute); H.R. REP. NO. 87-428, at 2, 4 (1961).
Act of Aug. 30, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-187, § 2, 75 Stat. 415, 416.
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lar to judgments in like causes.” 128 Accordingly, settlements that did
not exceed $100,000 could be paid from the Judgment Fund if a
judgment on that claim would have been paid from the Fund and no
129
other source was mandated by law to pay such settlements.
The FTCA’s specific directive that settlements under its provisions
130
be paid from “appropriations available to such agency,” brought
131
FTCA settlements within the “otherwise provided by law” exception.
In his letter supporting the 1961 legislation, Attorney General Robert
Kennedy pointedly noted that, “The draft proposal does not disturb
the procedure presently followed with respect to the payment of
compromises effected in suits in the U.S. district courts under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, such settlements being payable solely from
132
agency appropriations.” The fact that FTCA settlements were paid
from agency appropriations was one reason Department of Justice
policy called for the solicitation and consideration of agency views on
133
proposed settlements. Because of the statutory mandate that FTCA
settlements be paid from agency funds, the Department of Justice settled FTCA cases with out-of-court stipulations instead of consent
134
judgments that would have been paid from the Judgment Fund.
In 1966, Congress substantially revised FTCA procedures, mandating the use of the administrative process for all claims regardless of
amount, altering the FTCA’s rule for attorney’s fees, and revising its
135
statutes of limitations. The 1966 amendments also directed that the
Judgment Fund be used to pay all litigative settlements under
$100,000 and any administrative settlement between $2,500 and
136
$100,000. Neither the committee reports nor the one witness who
appeared at the hearing on the proposed changes (the Civil Divi-

128

129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136

Id. The statute also broadened coverage to include judgments from state and foreign
courts. See id. § 1 (authorizing the United States to pay final judgments of foreign courts,
provided the Attorney General determines that it is in the interest of the United States to
do so).
Id.; H.R. REP. NO. 87-428, at 2–3, 5–6 (1961).
Act of Sept. 23, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-830, § 9, 64 Stat. 985, 987.
Sidney B. Jacoby, The 89th Congress and Government Litigation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1212,
1218, 1218 n.37 (1967).
H.R. REP. NO. 87-428, at 6 (1961).
John G. Laughlin, The Compromise of Federal Tort Claims Act Litigation, 1965 A.B.A. SEC. INS.
NEGL. & COMP. L. PROC. 551, 553 (1965).
Jacoby, supra note 131, at 1218 n.37.
Act of July 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-506, §§ 2, 4, 7, 80 Stat. 306, 306–07.
Id. §§ 1(c), 6, 80 Stat. at 306–07.
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sion’s Assistant Attorney General) addressed why FTCA settlements
137
were to be paid from the Judgment Fund.
In 1977, Congress further extended the Judgment Fund to cover,
inter alia, all Court of Claims and FTCA judgments regardless of
138
amount, and all FTCA settlements for more than $2,500. Congress
took this action to eliminate what it had come to see as an “extra, unnecessary legislative step and improve the efficiency with which the
139
government makes settlement on its just debts.” In 1978, it adopted
the same, open-ended use of the Judgment Fund for several other
statutes that had required congressional appropriations for pay140
ments.
The Judgment Fund pays settlements and court-ordered judg141
142
ments, but it is available only under very specific circumstances.
137

138

139
140

141

142

See S. REP. NO. 89-1327 (1966) (lacking discussion on the issue); H.R. REP. NO. 89-1532
(1966) (same); Improvement of Procedures in Claims Settlement and Government Litigation:
Hearing before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 5 (1966); Jacoby, supra note 131, at 1218.
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-26, ch. 14, 91 Stat. 61, 96–97; S.
REP. NO. 95-64, at 173, 204-06 . The statute did require that the Postal Service and specific non-appropriated fund instrumentalities reimburse the United States for any settlement or judgments paid on their account from the Judgment Fund. See Supplemental
Appropriations Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-26, ch. 14, 91 Stat. at 97 (listing, for example,
“the Army and Air Force Exchange Service, Navy Exchanges, Marine Corps Exchanges,
Coast Guard Exchanges, or Exchange Councils of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration”).
H.R. REP. NO. 95-98, at 184 (1977).
See Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-240, § 201, 92 Stat. 107, 116;
see also S. REP. NO. 95-564, at 76–77 (1977) (identifying the Military Claims Act, the National Guard Claims Act, the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, the Small
Claims Act, and the Indian Claims Commission). Congress has seen fit to have some
damages settlements paid from agency appropriations. One example is the Attorney
General’s authority to settle claims for damages caused by law enforcement officers that
could not be brought under the FTCA. 31 U.S.C. § 3724 (2012). A 1989 amendment to
the statute increased the Attorney General’s settlement authority to $50,000 and brought
coverage to more Justice Department law enforcement agencies. Act of Dec. 7, 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101-203, § 1, 103 Stat. 1805, 1805. The legislative history of that amendment
recognized that such settlements are paid from agency appropriations. See H.R. REP. NO.
101-46, at 6 (1989).
2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-34; see also
United States v. Varner, 400 F.2d 369, 372 (5th Cir. 1968) (reading the legislative history
of the Judgment Fund and noting the Fund’s primary purpose was “to provide for the
prompt payment of judgments and thereby to eliminate or reduce the costs of interest”);
United States v. Maryland, 349 F.2d 693, 695 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (observing that the Judgment Fund’s goal was to allow claimants to “receive prompt payment without awaiting a
special appropriation”).
Its key provisions provide:
(a) Necessary amounts are appropriated to pay final judgments, awards, compromise settlements, and interest and costs specified in the judgments or otherwise authorized by law
when—
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It can pay awards or settlements only if they are “final” and not sub143
The Judgment Fund is available only for
ject to further appeal.
144
monetary awards, as opposed to injunctive relief that requires the
145
expenditure of funds. It can only make a payment that “is not oth146
erwise provided for,” which is one that cannot be legally paid from
147
This is so, even if an agency has
another appropriation or fund.
run out of funds, because “there is only one proper source of funds
148
in any given case.” Payments can only be made for litigative awards
149
under statutes designated by Congress. A Judgment Fund payment
150
must be certified by the Secretary of the Treasury, but the certifica-

143

144

145
146
147

148
149

150

(1) payment is not otherwise provided for;
(2) payment is certified by the Secretary of the Treasury; and
(3) the judgment, award, or settlement is payable—
(A) under section 2414 [“Payment of judgments and compromise settlements” from District Courts and the Court of International Trade],
2517 [Payment of Judgments from the Court of Federal Claims],
2672 [FTCA agency approved administrative claims], or 2677 [FTCA Attorney
General approved settlements] of title 28;
(B) under section 3723 of this title [the “Small Claims Act,” allowing agency
settlement of small property claims];
(C) under a decision of a board of contract appeals; or
(D) in excess of an amount payable from the appropriations of an agency for
a meritorious claim under section 2733 or 2734 of title 10 [Settlement of specific claims by the military], section 715 of title 32 [same], or section 20113 of
title 51 [Specified “Powers of the Administration in performance of functions”].
31 U.S.C. § 1304(a).
Id.; see also Marathon Oil Co. v. United States, 374 F.3d 1123, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (defining final judgment as “[a] court’s last action that settles the rights of the parties and
disposes of all issues in controversy, except for the award of costs (and, sometimes, attorney’s fees) and enforcement of the judgment” (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 847
(7th ed. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)); 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-36 (noting that “a judgment against the United
States is final for payment purposes when the appellate process is completed”).
See 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-38 (“Money judgments have ‘traditionally taken the form of a lump sum, paid at the conclusion of
the litigation.’” (quoting Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 533
(1983))).
See id. (explaining that injunctions such as those that direct agencies to implement government programs or repair buildings do not meet the Judgment Fund requirement).
31 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(1).
62 Comp. Gen. 12, 14 (1982); see also 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS
LAW, supra note 1, at 14-39 (explaining that payment is “otherwise provided for” when
“another appropriation or fund is legally available to satisfy the judgment”).
2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-40 .
31 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(3); see also 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW,
supra note 1, at 14-32 to 14-34 (addressing the statutes listed in § 1304(a)(3), observing
that “Congress sometimes includes a provision in other legislation making particular
items payable from the Judgment Fund,” and noting that the Judgment Fund was intended to pay matters “under authority of the Justice Department”).
31 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(2).
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tion requirement is ministerial in nature, requiring an evaluation of
whether the restrictions and limits on the Judgment Fund are met, as
151
opposed to assessing the merits of a settlement or judgment.
The Judgment Fund’s chief purpose is to pay settlements and
152
court ordered judgments. It is available to pay judgments awarded
153
154
by U.S. district courts, the Court of International Trade, and the
155
156
157
Court of Federal Claims, administrative claims, and settlements.
It is the correct source of payment for most FTCA judgments and set158
tlements for more than $2,500. It is the initial source for payment
159
of monetary awards by boards of contract appeals. Normally agencies are not required to reimburse the Judgment Fund for non160
contract claims and judgments, except in limited instances includ161
ing non-appropriated fund instrumentalities, judgments against the

151

152

153
154

155
156
157
158
159

160
161

See 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-33
(“[C]ertification under section 1304 does not involve reviewing the merits of the awards
submitted for payment.”).
Id. at 14-34; see also Varner, 400 F.2d at 372 (reading the legislative history of the Judgment
Fund and noting the fund’s primary purpose was “to provide for the prompt payment of
judgments and thereby to eliminate or reduce the costs of interest”); Maryland, 349 F.2d
at 695 (observing that the Judgment Fund’s goal was to allow claimants to “receive
prompt payment without awaiting a special appropriation”).
31 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(3)(A) (referencing 28 U.S.C. § 2414 (Supp. IV 2011)); see, e.g.,
Lozada v. United States, 974 F.2d 986, 988 (8th Cir. 1992).
31 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(3)(A) (referencing 28 U.S.C. § 2414 (Supp. IV 2011)); see, e.g., Luciano Pisoni Fabbrica Accessori Instrumenti Musicali v. United States, 11 C.I.T. 280, 282
(1987), aff’d, 837 F.2d 465 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
31 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(3)(A) (referencing 28 U.S.C. § 2517 (2012)); see, e.g., Cardiosom,
L.L.C. v. United States, 656 F.3d 1322, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Slattery, 635 F.3d at 1302.
31 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(3)(A) (referencing 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (2012)).
Id.
2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-48.
31 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(3)(C) (2012); 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS
LAW, supra note 1, at 14-48; 41 U.S.C. § 7108(a)–(b) (Supp. IV 2011); Bureau of Land
Mgmt.–Reimbursement of Contract Disputes Act Payments, April 24, 1984, 63 Comp.
Gen. 308 (1984); see, e.g., The Boeing Co., ASBCA No. 54853, 06-1 BCA ¶ 33270, 2009
WL 4738163 (Apr. 12, 2006); Montage, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of State, GSBCA No. 16758-ST,
2006 WL 2978322 (Oct. 12, 2006); Appeals of the Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, IBCA
No. 4711, 06-1 BCA ¶ 33253, 2006 WL 6435815 (Apr. 14, 2006); SecTek, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., DOTCAB No. 4516, 05-2 BCA ¶ 33067, 2005 WL 3789969 (Sept. 8,
2005).
2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-32, 14-32
n.62.
See id. at 15-266 (noting that non-appropriated fund instrumentalities (“NAFIs”) generally
must pay judgments from their own funds); see also United States v. Hopkins, 427 U.S.
123, 127 (1976) (suggesting that unless it specifically acts, Congress does not intend to assume NAFIs’ obligations); Mignogna v. Sair Aviation, Inc., 937 F.2d 37, 42 (2d Cir. 1991)
(noting that NAFIs may be subject to claims against them and their non-appropriated assets).
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U.S. Postal Service, 162 discrimination or retaliation claims filed by fed163
eral employees, and awards to contractors under contract dispute
164
procedures.
E. Normalizing Use of the Judgment Fund
Federal agencies have sought through procedural devices to have
the Judgment Fund pay expenses that would otherwise come from
appropriated funds. In some circumstances, Congress has addressed
this problem by requiring agencies to reimburse the Judgment Fund.
Efforts to contain such raids on the Judgment Fund have had mixed
results.
1. The Contracts Disputes Act
165

In 1978, Congress passed the Contract Disputes Act (“CDA”) to
rationalize the “administrative and judicial procedures for the settle166
ment of claims and disputes relating to Government contracts.”
Among other changes, the CDA modified the method by which judicial judgments and awards from boards of contract appeals are paid.
Prior to the CDA, judicial judgments were paid from the Judgment
Fund and board of contract appeal awards were paid from agency
167
funds. The CDA provided that (1) both court judgments and monetary awards from boards of contract appeals would be paid from the
168
Judgment Fund, and (2) agencies would reimburse the Judgment
162
163
164

165
166

167

168

See 39 U.S.C. § 409(h) (2012) (requiring the Postal Service to pay judgments against it
from its own funds).
Notification and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation (No FEAR) Act,
Pub. L. No. 107-174, § 201(b), 116 Stat. 566, 568–69 (2002).
41 U.S.C. § 7108(c) (Supp. IV 2011). The Judgment Fund statute addresses two other
issues that are only tangentially relevant to the topic under discussion. They are the payment of interest, 31 U.S.C. § 1304(b), and the payment of judgments and settlements
arising from contracts of military exchanges. 31 U.S.C. § 1304(c).
Contract Disputes Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383 (1978) [hereinafter
“CDA”] (codified at 41 U.S.C. § 7101 et seq. (2006)).
H.R. REP. NO. 95-1556, at 5 (1978); see generally Clarence Kipps, Tom Kindness & Cameron Hamrick, The Contract Disputes Act: Solid Foundations, Magnificent System, 28 PUB. CONT.
L. J. 585, 585–87 (1999) (comparing CDA with the prior system for resolving federal contract disputes).
Major Key, Reimbursement of the Judgment Fund Under the Contract Disputes Act, 2000 ARMY
LAW. 32, 33 (2000) (citing S. REP. NO. 95-1118, at 33 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5235, 5267); see also 1994 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS
LAW, supra note 8, at 14-11.
CDA, Pub. L. No. 95-563, § 13, 92 Stat. 2383, 2389 (1978). An exception was made for
judgments and awards against the Tennessee Valley Authority. Id. § 13(d), 92 Stat. at
2389.
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Fund for those payments from “available funds or by obtaining addi169
Congress included the
tional appropriations for such purposes.”
reimbursement requirement in the CDA to make agencies more ac170
countable and to facilitate compromise. Before the CDA, agencies
had an incentive to prolong litigation and force a final judgment in
court because those judgments were paid from the Judgment Fund
171
This practice hid the true costs of
rather than from agency funds.
programs by allowing agencies to avoid either paying all program
costs from appropriated funds or having to seek new appropriations
172
from Congress. The new procedure also expedited payments when
agencies ran out of appropriated funds and reduced government in173
terest costs.
The system did not work as planned because agencies frequently
failed to reimburse the Judgment Fund for CDA payments made
from it on their behalf. For fiscal years 2001–2003, less than twenty
percent of CDA money paid from the Judgment Fund was reim174
On average it took 9.6 months to complete payment on
bursed.
175
those cases for which the Judgment Fund was fully reimbursed.
The repayment rate improved to 45.9% in 2004, 27.8% in 2005, and
176
27.4% in 2006. Although the CDA does not specify when agencies
must reimburse the Judgment Fund, Treasury regulations suggest repayment should be made “promptly upon notification . . . of the

169
170

171
172

173

174

175

176

Id. § 13(c), 92 Stat. at 2389.
See S. REP. NO. 95-1118, at 33 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5235, 5267 (suggesting that reimbursement ensures that agencies pay the actual total costs of programs);
H.R. REP. NO. 95-1556, at 31–32 (1978). See generally Key, supra note 167, at 33 (tracing
the history of agencies’ payment responsibilities under the CDA).
S. REP. NO. 95-1118, at 33, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5267 (observing the perverse
incentive not to settle claims).
Id.; accord H.R. REP. NO. 95-1556, at 86 (1978); see also Letter from Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller Gen. of the United States, to Rep. Peter W. Rodino, Chairman, H. Comm. on the
Judiciary (Aug. 17, 1977) (noting that the CDA’s reimbursement provision would eliminate “the existing incentive” agencies had to avoid settlements, and would provide greater
transparency of the actual “economic cost of procurement programs”).
H.R. REP. NO. 95-1556, at 31–32; see also Bell BCI Co. v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 664, 668
(2010) (suggesting that the purpose of the new procedure was to save on the cost of interest to the government (citing Bath Iron Works Corp. v. United States, 20 F.3d 1567,
1583 (Fed. Cir. 1994))).
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-481, JUDGMENT FUND:
TREASURY’S
ESTIMATES OF CLAIM PAYMENT PROCESSING COSTS UNDER THE NO FEAR ACT AND
CONTRACT DISPUTES ACT 4 (2004) [hereinafter GAO-04-481].
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-295R, THE JUDGMENT FUND: STATUS OR
REIMBURSEMENTS REQUIRED BY THE NO FEAR ACT AND CONTRACT DISPUTES ACT 8 (2008)
[hereinafter GAO-08-295R].
Id. at 9.
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amount due”; 177 Treasury lacks authority to compel payment.178
Agencies told Treasury that they deferred making the required payments because doing so would have adversely affected their programs
179
and key activities. In 2007, Treasury’s Financial Management Service initiated actions to improve agency responsiveness, including the
posting on its website of outstanding balances owed to the Judgment
180
Fund.
2. The No FEAR Act
The 2002 Notification and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination
181
and Retaliation Act (“No FEAR Act”) addressed the problem of
182
chronic discrimination and retaliation in the federal workplace. It
did so by requiring greater notification to federal employees of their
183
184
rights, in-depth reporting about cases of agency discrimination,
and, similar to the CDA’s payment scheme, agency reimbursement of
the Judgment Fund for payments made from it for “judgments,
awards, and compromise settlements” arising from discriminatory
185
conduct directed at federal employees or applicants.
Requiring agency reimbursement addressed the fact that although
186
discrimination claims were increasing, agencies had little financial
motivation to change bad practices because adverse judgments had
177
178
179
180

181
182

183
184
185
186

31 C.F.R. § 256.41 (2013).
See GAO-08-295R, supra note 175, at 9.
See GAO-04-481, supra note 174, at 4.
See GAO-08-295R, supra note 175, at 10–11 (listing actions such as using billing letters,
phone calls and emails, and increasing agency awareness); see also 5 C.F.R. § 724.101 et
seq. (2005) (establishing similar provisions for the No FEAR Act).
Notification and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107–174, 116 Stat. 566 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 2301 (2012)).
H.R. REP. NO. 107-101, 2001 WL 670677, 7–9 (2001), reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 419,
419–22; S. REP. NO. 107-143, at 6–7 (2002). The Act grew out of an investigation by the
House Science Committee into discrimination at the Environmental Protection Agency.
S. REP. NO. 107-143, at 2 (2002); see generally Intolerance at EPA—Harming People, Harming
Science?: Hearing before the H. Comm. on Sci., 106th Cong. 91–92 (2000) (discussing the
EPA’s history of discrimination and retaliation issues); Lindsey Nelson, Mission Not Accomplished: Missing Billions in Iraq, Enhanced Whistleblower Protections, and A Large Failure in A
Small Step, 38 PUB. CONT. L.J. 277, 291 (2008) (noting three causes of the EPA’s problems
that led to enactment of the No FEAR Act).
Pub. L. No. 107–174, § 202, 116 Stat. at 569.
Id. § 203, 116 Stat. at 569.
Id. § 201, 116 Stat. at 568.
See Notification and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation Act of 2001: Hearing on
H.R. 169 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 6 (2001) (statement of Kweisi
Mfume, President and CEO, NAACP) (decrying the increase in discrimination claims
within the federal government and suggesting that bringing a formal claim is “often tantamount to a death sentence for a person’s career within the federal government”).
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no effect on their bottom line. 187 Prior to enactment of the No FEAR
Act, payment of damages arising from federal employment discrimination claims was handled in a two-tier system: claims that were resolved on the administrative level were paid from agency funds, while
188
claims resolved in the courts were paid from the Judgment Fund.
This circumstance provided a “perverse incentive” for agencies to re189
sist settlement of discrimination claims at the administrative level.
As the Senate Report explained, use of the Judgment Fund “discourages accountability by being a disincentive to agencies to resolve matters promptly in the administrative processes; by not pursuing resolution, an agency could shift the cost of resolution from its budget to
the Judgment Fund and escape the scrutiny that would accompany a
190
The No FEAR Act rerequest for a supplemental appropriation.”
moved that disincentive by requiring federal agencies to reimburse
the Judgment Fund for payments made on discrimination and retali191
ation claims.
Reimbursement rates were much higher for No FEAR payments
192
than for CDA payments, although the No FEAR Act similarly did
193
For fiscal years 2004–2006
not set a deadline for reimbursements.
187

188
189

190

191

192
193

See S. REP. NO. 107-143, at 3 (observing that, in fiscal year 2000, agencies were relieved of
paying almost $43 million in discrimination claims because of the Judgment Fund); 147
CONG. REC. 778 (Jan. 29, 2001) (statement of Sen. John Warner) (“I firmly believe that
because there is no financial consequence to their actions, Federal agencies are essentially able to escape responsibility when they fail to comply with the law and are unresponsive
to their employees’ concerns.”).
H.R. REP. NO. 107-101, at 13, reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 419, 425-26; S. REP. NO. 107143, at 7.
The Committee on the Judiciary used the term “perverse incentive” in the House Report:
The Committee finds that allowing Federal agencies to use the general treasury as
a slush fund to pay court judgments and settlements for discriminating and retaliating, has created:
(1) a lack of accountability among some of the Federal agencies; and
(2) a perverse incentive for agencies to prolong the cases until they reach court.
H.R. REP. NO. 107-101, at 13, reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 426. See also id. at 52, 54
(illustrating, in the statement of Rep. Nadler, the use of the term “perverse incentive”).
S. REP. NO. 107-143, at 3 (quoting J. Christopher Mihm, General Accounting Office, Testimony Before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, May 9, 2001, p.
8).
Pub. L. No. 107–174, § 201, 116 Stat. at 568; see also S. REP. NO. 107-143, at 3 (observing
that agencies will still use the Judgment Fund to initially pay the discrimination claims to
prevent large settlements or judgments from disrupting agency operations in the short
term); H.R. REP. NO. 107-101, pt. 1, at 13, reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 419, 427 (observing that smaller agencies can spread Judgment Fund reimbursement payments over several years, as the No FEAR Act only requires payment within a reasonable amount of
time).
GAO-08-295R, supra note 175, at 8.
See, e.g., VIVIAN S. CHU & BRIAN T. YEH, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE
JUDGMENT FUND: HISTORY, ADMINISTRATION, AND COMMON USAGE 15 (2013) [hereinafter

Oct. 2015]

THE JUDGMENT FUND

171

nearly all No FEAR payments were reimbursed, with the average time
194
A key reason for
of repayment dropping to 2.9 months in 2006.
this higher reimbursement rate is the smaller relative size of No
195
FEAR payments compared to agency budgets.
3. The Equal Access to Justice Act
Congress enacted the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”) in 1980
to help smaller entities protect their rights and seek review of gov196
ernment conduct without being deterred by litigation expenses.
The statute used the carrot of reimbursing attorneys fees to entities
197
that succeeded against the government and the stick of subtracting
those fees from appropriated funds of agencies that acted in bad faith
198
or took positions that were not substantially justified. EAJA created
three fee-shifting mechanisms to allow eligible parties to recover costs
and attorneys fees incurred in agency adjudications and civil litiga199
tion against a federal agency or the United States. The first, applicable to judicial cases and codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b), makes the
United States liable for attorney fees “to the same extent that any
other party would be liable under the common law or under the
terms of any statute which specifically provides for such an award” un200
Accordingly, the
less another statute prohibits such an award.
United States is liable for attorney fees under federal fee-shifting stat201
utes and exceptions to the “American Rule” on attorneys’ fees. The
statute provides that fees awarded under § 2412(b) are to be paid
from the Judgment Fund unless the agency is “found to have acted in

194
195
196

197
198
199
200
201

CRS JUDGMENT FUND], https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42835.pdf (noting statute
provides no “definitive period”).
See GAO-08-295R, supra note 175, at 5 (noting that of $45.1 million through fiscal year
2006, $44.9 million had been reimbursed by April 2007).
See id. at 8, 13. For fiscal years 2002–2006 the average CDA payment was $2.1 million; the
average No FEAR payment (2004–2006) was $72,064. Id. at 5–6.
Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96–481, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 504; 28 U.S.C. § 2412); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO12-417R, LIMITED DATA AVAILABLE ON USDA AND INTERIOR ATTORNEY FEE CLAIMS AND
PAYMENTS 1 (2012) [hereinafter GAO 12-417R] (“The premise of EAJA was to help ensure that decisions to contest administrative actions are based on the merits and not the
cost of litigation . . . .”); Louise L. Hill, An Analysis and Explanation of the Equal Access to Justice Act, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 229, 230 (1987) (“The fundamental purpose of the EAJA is to allow certain parties to challenge unreasonable federal government action.”).
See S. REP. NO. 96-253, at 5–6 (1980) (recognizing the civic value of showing government
policies are erroneous or inaccurate); H.R. REP. NO. 96-1418, at 10 (1980) (same).
H.R. REP. NO. 96-1418, at 17 (noting punitive aspect of reducing agency budgets).
Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. at 2325, 2327; GAO-12-417R, supra note 196, at 7.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (2012).
2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-68, 14-69.
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bad faith,” in which case they are to be paid from the agency’s
202
funds.
EAJA’s other two fee-shifting mechanisms are similar to each other. The second litigation fee mandate, codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d), applies when the United States loses in certain judicial
proceedings “unless the court finds [its] position . . . was substantially
203
The administrative adjudications mandate, 5 U.S.C.
justified….”
§ 504, awards fees when a losing agency’s position is not found by the
204
adjudicative officer to be “substantially justified.” The 1980 statute
provided that fees and expenses under both provisions “may be paid
by any agency over which the party prevails from any funds made
available to the agency, by appropriation or otherwise, for such purpose. If not paid by any agency, the fees and other expenses shall be
205
paid [from the Judgment Fund].”
Agencies have aggressively sought to have the Judgment Fund pay
206
EAJA fees. In 1982 the Department of Transportation argued that
the use of “may” in these provisions meant that agencies had discretion to pay an EAJA award from agency funds, or not; if the agency
207
did not choose to pay the bill the Judgment Fund would. The Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) rejected this position as inconsistent with EAJA’s legislative history and concluded
208
that at least some fees must be paid from agency appropriations. In
1985, Congress amended EAJA and eliminated any agency discretion
by rescinding the “may be paid” language and directing that “Fees
and other expenses awarded under this subsection shall be paid by
any agency . . . from any funds made available to the agency by ap209
propriation or otherwise.” It did so intending that the award of fees

202
203

204
205
206

207
208
209

28 U.S.C. § 2412(c)(2).
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (“Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court
shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, in
addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that party in any
civil action (other than cases sounding in tort).”).
5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1).
Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. at 2327, 2329 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., CRS JUDGMENT FUND, supra note 193, at 12 (“Since the passage of EAJA, agencies
have disputed whether payments under the act must be made out of their appropriations
or whether attorneys’ fees may be charged to the Judgment Fund.”).
6 Op. O.L.C. 204, 210–11 (1982).
Id. at 210–12.
Act of Aug. 5, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-80, § 1(e), 99 Stat. 183, 184 (amending 5 U.S.C. §
504(d)); see also id. at 185 (using nearly identical language to amend 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(4)).
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from agency funds provide agencies a strong disincentive against tak210
ing unreasonable positions.
A similar EAJA payment issue arose in the aftermath of the Feder211
al Circuit’s decision in Cienega Gardens v. United States, which found
for plaintiffs in a suit regarding amendments to a Department of
212
Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) program. Even though
EAJA squarely provided for payment of this award from agency ap213
propriations, HUD urged that payment should come from the
Judgment Fund because the plaintiffs had sued the United States and
214
not the agency. The Treasury Department argued that because the
party won in an action over an agency, HUD was responsible for the
215
Resolving the dispute, the OLC determined that HUD
payment.
216
OLC clarified that “HUD constitutes the agency over
had to pay.
217
Further, OLC
which the party prevailed” as determined by EAJA.
concluded that “[t]he Judgment Fund is available to pay a
[§ 2412(d)(4)] fee award only if there is no agency over which the
218
plaintiffs can be said to have prevailed under EAJA.”
The legislative goal to have the threat of awarding fees from agen219
cy funds serve as a deterrent to unreasonable agency positions and
220
the change of statutory language from agencies “may” pay to
221
“shall” pay fees and expenses granted by EAJA, suggest that Congress intended for many EAJA payments to come from agency appro222
This is not necessarily what happens. There is tension
priations.
210

211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222

See 131 Cong. Rec. S9991-02 (daily ed. July 24, 1985) (statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley)
(noting that EAJA’s positive effect on agency action will improve “with the passage of this
bill, which provides for the fees payment out of the offending agency’s budget”); H.R.
REPT. 99-120, at 8 (1985) (noting the increase in liability for administrative agencies due
to EAJA); H.R. REP. 98-992, at 9 (1984) (clarifying the “substantially justified” standard as
including positions taken prior to litigation); S. REP. 98-586, at 19 (1984) (discussing the
requirement that fee awards must come from “the offending agency’s budget”).
331 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1324.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(4); 31 Op. O.L.C. 229, 233 (2007).
31 Op. O.L.C. at 233–34.
Id. at 234.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 242 (stating the same).
Id. at 236.
131 CONG. REC. S9991-02 (daily ed. July 24, 1985) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
Pub. L. No. 96–481, 94 Stat. 2325, 2327, 2329 (1980).
Act of Aug. 5, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 183, 184–85; 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF
FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-70.
See CRS JUDGMENT FUND, supra note 193, at 13 (“The opinion did not leave open the possibility that agencies could be reimbursed for awards made pursuant to EAJA from the
Judgment Fund and strongly suggested they would have to use their own appropriations.”).
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between § 2412(b)’s directive that attorneys’ fees be paid from the
Judgment Fund if a fee-shifting statute or common law attorneys fee
223
rule applies (absent agency “bad faith”), and the requirement of
§ 2412(d) and § 504 that they be paid from agency appropriations if
224
the agency lost (unless its position was “substantially justified”).
While the line between these alternatives may be clear in the abstract,
in practice it may be hard to see, particularly when the people negotiating the payment are the attorney who will receive the fee and the
government attorney who handled the litigation.
Discussion about the scope and nature of EAJA payments is particularly heated in environmental matters involving the EPA, the Department of the Interior, and the Department of Agriculture. Critics
suggest that environmental organizations use a “sue and settle” strategy to bypass the normal administrative process when they sue an
agency, the agency settles, and the resulting consent decree effective225
ly becomes a binding regulation. Use of EAJA is seen as part of that
strategy and as an incentive for environmental organizations to bring
226
Some have questioned whether agencies actively invite such
suit.
227
One side in this debate has called for wholesale reform
litigation.

223
224
225

226

227

28 U.S.C. § 2412(b), (c)(2) (2012).
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), (d)(4); 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(c)(1), (d)(3),
(d)(4).
See Henry N. Butler & Nathaniel J. Harris, Sue, Settle, and Shut Out the States: Destroying the
Environmental Benefits of Cooperative Federalism, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 582–86
(2014) (describing the “sue and settle” process and summarizing the problems it causes);
Temple Stoellinger, Seeing Through the Regional Haze, 37 WYO. LAW. 34, 37 (2014) (explaining that “where environmental groups sue the EPA, the EPA then agrees to settle the
lawsuits through a binding decree which dictates rules for EPA’s action, thereby eliminating that state’s ability to engage in negotiations with EPA”). House Agriculture Committee Ranking Member Collin C. Peterson explained this viewpoint in an Op-Ed piece:
[T]here seems to be a pattern of an activist lawsuit, followed by an EPA settlement,
resulting in new EPA regulations to comply with the settlement . . . resulting in
policy decisions being made by activists, bureaucrats and lawyers . . . . This socalled “sue and settle” strategy keeps the process in the dark.
Collin C. Peterson, Peterson Op-Ed: Time to Clean Up the EPA, 112 H. PRESS RELEASE (Mar.
18, 2011), http://democrats.agriculture.house.gov/press/PRArticle.aspx?NewsID=1101 .
See Lowell E. Baier, Reforming the Equal Access to Justice Act, 38 J. LEGIS. 1, 49–50 (2012)
(noting that in the twelve months beginning on September 1, 2009, “twenty frequent environmental litigants” received at least $5.8 million in EAJA payments); see also Michael J.
Mortimer & Robert W. Malmsheimer, The Equal Access to Justice Act and US Forest Service
Land Management: Incentives to Litigate?, 109 J. FORESTRY 352, 353–54 (2011) (cataloging
studies of EAJA payments in environmental cases).
Regulatory Chaos: Finding Legislative Solutions to Benefit Jobs and the Economy: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Environment and the Economy of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 112th
Cong. 77 (2011) (statement of Rep. Whitfield) (“[W]e have reason to believe from discussions with a lot of different groups that EPA is actually out there encouraging these
lawsuits . . . .”); see also id. at 69 (question by Rep. Shimkus).
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of EAJA to account for this “strategy”; 228 the other argues for preserva229
tion of the statute and its use in environmental litigation.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF CLAIMS PAYMENTS
A. The Statements and Accounts Clause
In the debate on the Statements and Accounts Clause at the Constitutional Convention, George Mason proposed that reports of expenditures should be required annually; James Madison argued that
the legislature should be given discretion to choose when to make
230
such disclosures. The Articles of Confederation had required semi231
Ultimately Madison’s view prevailed, resulting in
annual reports.
232
the Clause’s “from time to time” language and leaving Congress
233
Both sides
with great latitude as to when to publish expenditures.
in the debate agreed that the public had a right to know how the
234
government spent its money.
Congress has very broad authority over public disclosure of ex235
Only a handful of cases have been brought under the
penditures.
Statement and Accounts Clause seeking disclosure of government
spending; none have succeeded. The most prominent treatment of
the issue was the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Richard-

228
229

230

231

232
233

234

235

See, e.g., Baier, supra note 226, at 69–70 (explaining possible methods of reform).
See, e.g., Brian Korpics et al., Shifting the Debate: In Defense of the Equal Access to Justice Act, 43
ENVTL. L. REP. 10985, 10998 (2013) (concluding there is “no clear economic or policy basis that would support a rewrite of EAJA”).
See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 14, at 618–19; Note,
Secret Funding, supra note 13, at 609–11 (noting Madison’s concerns that annual reports
would prove to be functionally useless and impractical).
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 5 (“The United States in Congress
assembled shall have authority . . . to borrow money, or emit bills on the credit of the
United States, transmitting every half-year to the respective States an account of the sums
of money so borrowed or emitted . . . .”).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 14, at 619; see also
Note, Secret Funding, supra note 13, at 609–11 (observing that even though Madison’s view
prevailed, concerns that the language would produce reports that were extremely infrequent surfaced at the New York state ratifying convention).
See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 14, at 619 (arguing
the debate really focused on how to best get the information to the people rather than on
whether the people should have the information); 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 149–50 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) (stating that “the People
who give their Money ought to know in what manner it is expended”).
See Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting that the Statement and
Accounts Clause “is not self-defining and Congress has plenary power to give meaning to
the provision”).
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son, 236 a challenge to the practice of making secret appropriations to
237
In Richardson, the Court found the petitioner lacked
the CIA.
standing because his grievance was shared by all members of the pub238
lic. Even though the Court did not reach the merits of the case, it
commented that, “Congress has plenary power to exact any reporting
239
and accounting it considers appropriate in the public interest.”
The Court noted that for almost 200 years the Statement and Accounts Clause had been read to give “Congress plenary power to spell
out the details of precisely when and with what specificity Executive
240
agencies must report the expenditure of appropriated funds….”
Richardson’s sweeping language virtually precludes any future disclo241
Although
sure claims under the Statement and Accounts Clause.
the meaning of the clause’s “from time to time” phrase is imprecise,
courts have consistently interpreted it as giving Congress complete
discretion over what information to provide about appropriations
242
and when to provide it.
B. Statutory Disclosure of Payments
The history of congressional requirements for public reporting of
government claims payments reflects a gradual series of changes that
eventually led to less and less reporting. Today, no one can know all
243
the claims the government pays in any year.

236
237
238
239
240
241
242

243

418 U.S. 166 (1974).
See id. at 169–70 (noting that the lower court’s decision focused on standing).
Id. at 178.
See id. at 178 n.11 (suggesting the Court need not decide the precise contours of the
clause’s requirement of a regular statement or account).
Id.
See, e.g., Halperin, 629 F.2d at 152 (citing Richardson and dismissing a constitutional challenge under art. I, § 9, cl. 7); Harrington, 553 F.2d at 194 n.7 (same).
See, e.g., Harrington, 553 F.2d at 195 (“Since Congressional power is plenary with respect to
the definition of the appropriations process and reporting requirements, the legislature
is free to establish exceptions to this general framework . . . .”); Hart’s Case, 16 Ct. Cl.
459, 484 (1880) (“The absolute control of the moneys of the United States is in Congress,
and Congress is responsible for its exercise of this great power only to the people.”).
See 1994 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 8, at 14-10 (describing the multitude of claims that can be brought). There are many different statutes
authorizing claims against the government. See CRS JUDGMENT FUND, supra note 193, at 7
(noting that “nearly 100 statutes . . . impact payment from the Judgment Fund”); 2008
GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-21 to 14-23 (listing
a “brief sampler” of authorities authorizing administrative settlement of claims); JAYSON &
LONGSTRETH, supra note 106, § 2.05 (listing twenty-four statues authorizing tort remedies
and observing that “[t]here simply was no uniformity, or consistency in, or any relationship between, most of these enactments”).
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In the early Republic, Congress kept close tabs on the payment of
claims. For example, the statute regarding Revolutionary War pen244
sions that gave rise to Hayburn’s Case called for detailed reports to
245
The statute for property
Congress about wounds and disabilities.
claims arising from the War of 1812 required that “all adjudica246
Of course, when Contions . . . shall be entered . . . in a book….”
gress passed a private law granting a remedy, the bill stated the claimant’s name, the amount of the payment or means of assessing it, and
247
typically the nature of the claim. The same information appears in
248
recent private relief bills.
When Congress established the Court of Claims in 1855, it initially
required that in each case the court forward to it a report and draft
249
When it passed the Amended Court of Claims
bill for enactment.
Act of 1863, it included a requirement that annual reports state the
250
The
names of successful claimants and the amounts received.
251
Tucker Act had a similar requirement for reports to Congress, and
252
Congress frequently appropriated funds to pay specific claims.
The FTCA, as originally enacted, called for heads of agencies to
annually report to Congress on all claims the agency paid under its
administrative claims authority, stating “the amount claimed and the

244
245
246
247

248

249
250

251
252

See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
Act of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. 11, §§ 2–4, 1 Stat. 243, 244.
Act of Apr. 9, 1816, ch. 40, § 14, 3 Stat. 261, 264.
See, e.g., An Act For the relief of Vern M. Stanchfield, ch. 100, 58 Stat. 960 (1944) (awarding $75 for loss of horse that was injured while being used by a Dept. of the Interior employee); An act for the relief of John L. T. Jones, of Montgomery County, Maryland, for
rent and damage sustained by the destruction of a dwelling house by accidental fire while
the same was being occupied by United States troops for quarters [in 1862], ch. 437, 18
Stat. 76 (1874) (awarding $4,000); An Act to increase the pension of William Munday, ch.
48, 6 Stat. 161 (1815) (awarding twenty dollar per month pension to a serviceman “who
lost both his arms in an attack on the enemy, at St. Leonard’s creek”).
See, e.g., An Act For the relief of retired Sergeant First Class James D. Benoit and Wan
Sook, Benoit, 116 Stat. 3119 (2002) (awarding $415,000 to compensate for death and
wrongful retention of remains of David Benoit “resulting from a fall . . . from an upper
level window while occupying military family housing supplied by the Army in Seoul, Korea”).
See Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122-23, § 7, 10 Stat. 612, 613–14 (requiring monthly, printed
reports).
See Act of 1863, Ch. 92, § 7, 12 Stat. 765, 766 (requiring report “of all sums paid at the
treasury on such judgments, together with the names of the parties in whose favor the
same were allowed”).
See Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, § 11, 24 Stat. 505, 507 (requiring the Attorney General to
report each final judgment of the Court of Claims).
See, e.g., Shimomura, supra note 26, at 661 (discussing appropriations for claims payments
in the 1870s).
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amount awarded, and a brief description of the claim.” 253 In 1965
254
Congress repealed this reporting requirement. It did so as part of
255
an effort to reduce needless reports and publications, reasoning
that information about claims settled for $2,500 or less was of “no
256
value to preparing agencies and no known use to Congress.”
The No FEAR Act mandated that each agency file an annual report identifying, inter alia, the number of cases alleging discrimination, the status of each, and the amount of money paid on each claim
257
and in the aggregate. It also required that each agency post on its
public website detailed statistical information about the status of discrimination complaints filed with the agency (but not including
money paid), and that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis258
sion post a summary of this statistical data on its website.
When it enacted the EAJA in 1980, Congress required an annual
report on the fees and expenses awarded under the act, identifying
“the number, nature, and amount of the awards[,]” and other rele259
The report was expected to allow Congress to
vant information.
evaluate EAJA’s cost and identify agencies engaged in unreasonable
260
activity. This report requirement was repealed as part of the Feder261
al Reports Elimination and Sunset Act of 1995, legislation enacted
262
to eliminate “unnecessary paperwork” and save staff time.

253
254
255
256

257
258
259

260

261
262

Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, § 404, 60 Stat. 812, 843 (1946) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2673 (2006)).
See Act of Nov. 8, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-348, § 1, 79 Stat. 1310, 1310 (repealing “The annual report to Congress of the administrative adjustment of tort claims of $2,500 or less”).
S. REP. NO. 89-545, at 2 (1965); see also H. REP. NO. 89-1169, at 3–5 (1965) (discussing the
potential savings from reducing reporting requirements).
S. REP. NO. 89-545, at 3 (1965). In 1966, Congress amended the FTCA to provide that
agency appropriations be used for FTCA settlements less than $2,500, the Judgment Fund
pay settlements between $2,500 and $100,000, and agencies could enter settlements of
administrative claims up to $25,000 without approval of the Attorney General. Act of July
18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-506, § 1 (a), (c), 80 Stat. 306. The statute did not address the
reporting requirement. Id.
Pub. L. No. 107-174, § 203(a), 116 Stat. 566, 569.
Id. § 301, 116 Stat. at 573; id. § 302, 116 Stat. at 575.
See Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 203(a)(1), 94 Stat. 2321, 2325–27
(1980) (amending new 5 U.S.C. § 504(e) to cover administrative proceedings expenses);
id. § 204(a), 94 Stat. at 2327–29 (adding new 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(5) regarding litigative
proceedings expenses).
See S. REP. NO. 96-253, at 18, 21–22 (1965). Initially assigned to the Chairman of the
Administrative Conference of the United States, the reporting duty for § 2412(d)(5) was
transferred to the Attorney General by the Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992.
Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 502(b), 106 Stat. 4506, 4512.
Pub. L. No. 104-66, § 1091(b), 109 Stat. 707, 722.
See S. REP. NO. 103-375, at 2 (1993) (discussing reasons to require fewer reports).
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III. ASSESSING JUDGMENT FUND PRACTICES
A. Raids on the Judgment Fund
1. Legislative Branch Encroachment
From the defendants’ side of the ledger, the Judgment Fund—this
permanent, indefinite appropriation—is a tempting target to agencies and entities seeking protection because it exists outside the normal appropriation process. For claims arising under statutes that do
not require reimbursement the Judgment Fund provides “free money” to agencies whose actions gave rise to the claims. For example, if
an agency program causes substantial claims under the FTCA, those
claims will be paid without any reduction in the agency’s programs or
requirement that the agency justify the cost of the claims to an ap263
Congress has authority to alter these
propriations committee.
rules, as it did when it mandated that the newly created Postal Service
reimburse the Judgment Fund for payments made arising from its ac264
tivities.
Entities outside the federal government have sought legislation
treating them as part of the government for FTCA purposes. When
granted, this status makes the Judgment Fund responsible for their
torts, absolves them of any financial responsibility, and renders the
265
Congress has
FTCA’s defenses applicable to claims against them.
provided this coverage to manufacturers and distributors of the vac266
cine in the National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, cer-

263

264

265

266

See 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-29 to 14-44
(discussing requirements that must be met to have payment made from the Judgment
Fund).
39 U.S.C. § 409(h); 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1,
at 14-41.
Non-appropriated fund instrumentalities (NAFIs) also generally pay their own judgments and settlements. 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra
note 1, at 14-42 to 14-43; see also Hopkins, 427 U.S. at 127 (suggesting that unless it specifically acts, Congress does not intend to assume NAFIs’ obligations); Mignogna, 937 F.2d at
42 (noting that NAFIs may be subject to claims against them and their non-appropriated
assets).
See, e.g., Gonzalez v. United States, 284 F.3d 281, 287 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting that the
FTCA “provide[d] the basis for the cause of action” against a community health center);
In re Consol. U.S. Atmospheric Testing Litig., 820 F.2d 982, 992 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting
that the FTCA sometimes applies to nuclear weapons contractors).
Pub. L. No. 94-380, 90 Stat. 1113 (1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 247b(k), subsequently
repealed, Health Services and Centers Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-626 § 202, 92
Stat. 3574); see also U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, 4-10.110 Payment of Judgments by the Department of the Treasury and Postal Service, 1997 WL 1944302 (noting special proce-
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tain tribal contractors, 267 and nuclear weapons contractors. 268 Because
the Judgment Fund works automatically, Congress has no occasion to
269
review and consider payments made on behalf of these entities.
Granting FTCA coverage to non-federal government entities may be
270
poor policy, but it is a political decision appropriately made by
Congress under its power of appropriation.
2. Executive Branch Encroachment
a. Executive Branch Authority over the Judgment Fund
The integrity of the Judgment Fund is dependent on the good
faith of executive branch officers. The key Judgment Fund provision
appropriates money “to pay final judgments, awards, [and] compro-

267

268

269
270

dures required when submitting Swine Flu settlements for payment from the Judgment
Fund).
Congress made the FTCA the exclusive remedy for torts of tribal employees and contractors acting under certain contracts or agreements, giving them the FTCA’s “full protection and coverage.” Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-512, Title III, § 314, 104 Stat.
1915, 1959 (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 450(f) (2012)); see also U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/RCED-00-169, FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT—ISSUES
AFFECTING COVERAGE FOR TRIBAL SELF-DETERMINATION CONTRACTS 25 fig. 5 (2000) [hereinafter GAO/RCED-00-169] (depicting history of the Self-Determination Act provisions
and subsequent amendments in graphic form); Joseph W. Gross, Comment, Help Me Help
You: Why Congress’s Attempt to Cover Torts Committed by Indian Tribal Contractors with the
FTCA Hurts the Government and the Tribes, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 383, 393–94 (2012) (discussing
Congress’s reasons for providing FTCA coverage to tribal contractors).
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, § 3141 Contractor Liability for
Injury or Loss of Property Arising out of Atomic Weapons Testing Programs, Pub. L. No.
101-510, 104 Stat. 1485 (1990) (amended by Pub.L. No. 101-510, Div. C, Title XXXI, §
3141, 104 Stat. 1837 (1990) and Pub. L. No. 113-66, Div. C, Title XXXI, § 3146(i)(2), 127
Stat. 1081 (2013)) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 2783 (formerly at 42 U.S.C. § 2212)); see also In
re Consol. U.S. Atmospheric Testing Litig., 820 F.2d at 990–91 (discussing the legislative
history of the bill that extended FTCA coverage to nuclear weapons contractors).
Congress provided analogous coverage to community health providers, albeit with a
proviso that the Judgment Fund be reimbursed from a special Department of Health and
Human Services fund. Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act of 1992, Pub.
L. No. 102-501, 106 Stat. 3268 (1992); 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS
LAW, supra note 1, at 15-266.
See, e.g., Gross, supra note 267, at 443 (noting that the “funds to pay tort judgments
against tribal contractors” are “given out automatically through the Judgment Fund”).
See President George H. W. Bush Statement on Signing Department of the Interior and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1991, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1558, 1559 (Nov. 5, 1990)
(noting that use of the FTCA is inconsistent with tribal autonomy and Indian self determination); see also GAO/RCED-00-169, supra note 267, 36 app. IV (Dept. of Interior
comments) (noting that FTCA coverage removes tribes’ incentive to reduce claims and
that sometimes tribes or their employees do not cooperate in defending claims); Gross,
supra note 267, at 400–03 (noting various practical problems of using the FTCA to cover
torts of non-federal entities).
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mise settlements….” 271 Decisions regarding how to litigate, whether
to appeal, and when to settle are made by executive branch officials,
usually the Attorney General or officials under his direction or to
whom he has delegated authority. A lack of due care on their part
could lead to payments from the Judgment Fund that are outside the
parameters set by Congress.
The Judgment Fund can pay only litigative awards—those that
272
The Department of Justice has
were or might be made in court.
presumptive responsibility for all litigation of the United States and
273
its agencies. Its statutory grant of authority states, “[e]xcept as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party . . . is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the
274
Attorney General.”
The Judgment Fund can pay awards or settlements only if they are
275
“final.” A judgment is final for Judgment Fund purposes when the
276
This happens when there is a final
appellate process is finished.
decision by a court of last resort, the time for filing an appeal expires,
277
or the parties decide not to seek review. Only the Solicitor General
has authority to determine “whether, and to what extent, appeals will
278
be taken by the Government” from adverse decisions.

271

272

273
274

275
276
277
278

See 31 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (explaining that the statute applies only when payment is not authorized from another source, the Secretary of the Treasury certifies it, and “the judgment, award or settlement is payable” under a statute designated by Congress); see also supra notes 12–18 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-34
(noting that the Judgment Fund was enacted primarily to pay “court judgments and settlements negotiated under authority of the Justice Department”); CRS JUDGMENT FUND,
supra note 193, at 6–7 (distinguishing administrative awards “which are provided for by
statute and paid from the agency’s appropriation”).
2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 15-222 to 15-223.
28 U.S.C. § 516; see also 28 U.S.C. § 519 (authorizing the Attorney General to “supervise
all litigation to which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party”); 5 U.S.C.
§ 3106 (requiring agencies to consult with the Department of Justice and restricting hiring of private attorneys). The term “agency” includes “any corporation in which the
United States has a proprietary interest….” 28 U.S.C. § 451. The Department of Justice
vigorously guards this authority. 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW,
supra note 1, at 15-222 to 15-223.
31 U.S.C. § 1304(a); see also 2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-36 (discussing the “finality” requirement).
2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-36.
Id. (citing 73 Comp. Gen. 46 (1993)).
28 C.F.R. § 0.20(b) (2013); see also United States v. Hare, 269 F.3d 859, 861 (7th Cir.
2001) (noting that only the Solicitor General has the “right to control appeals of the
United States”).
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The Attorney General has broad authority to settle litigation un279
280
der his supervision and to delegate that settlement authority. He
has delegated to Assistant Attorneys General the authority to
“[a]ccept offers in compromise of, or settle administratively, claims
against the United States in all cases in which the principal amount of
281
the proposed settlement does not exceed $2,000,000,” and “to redelegate to subordinate division officials and United States Attorneys”
282
For example, U.S. Attorneys can redelegate their
that authority.
authority to “Assistant United States Attorneys who supervise other
283
Assistant United States Attorneys who handle civil litigation.”
The Attorney General also delegated authority to settle adminis284
trative tort claims to other Justice Department components and to
285
some agencies that handle numerous claims. Thus, the Postal Service and the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs have authority up to $300,000, while the Departments of Health and Human
Services, Transportation, and Homeland Security have authority up
286
to $200,000, $100,000, and $50,000, respectively. All agencies have
$25,000 in independent statutory authority under the FTCA to settle
287
administrative claims. In practice, agencies can settle FTCA claims
for an amount up to their authority, absent some complicating factor
288
such as a new precedent or potential third party claim.

279

280
281
282

283
284

285
286
287

288

28 U.S.C. § 2414 (2011) states:
Except as otherwise provided by law, compromise settlements of claims referred to
the Attorney General for defense of imminent litigation or suits against the United
States, or against its agencies or officials upon obligations or liabilities of the United States, made by the Attorney General or any person authorized by him, shall be
settled and paid in a manner similar to judgments in like causes and appropriations or funds available for the payment of such judgments are hereby made available for the payment of such compromise settlements.
28 U.S.C. § 510.
28 C.F.R. § 0.160(a)(2).
28 C.F.R. § 0.168(a). The redelegation of authority to U.S. Attorneys to accept offers in
compromise is limited to “cases in which the principal amount of the proposed settlement does not exceed $1,000,000.” 28 C.F.R. § 0.168(d)(2).
28 C.F.R. Pt. 0, Subpt. Y, App., Civ. Div. Directive, No. 1-10 § 1(b)(2).
See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 0.172(a) (authorizing directors of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Prisons, Federal Prison Industries, the United States Marshals Service, and the Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives to settle tort claims up to $50,000).
See 28 C.F.R. § 14.
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 2672. The Judgment Fund pays administrative settlements that exceed
$2,500; settlements for $2,500 or less are paid from agency funds. Id.; see also JAYSON &
LONGSTRETH, supra note 196, at § 17.12 (discussing payment of administrative awards).
28 C.F.R. § 14.6(d). FTCA administrative settlements that exceed the agency’s authorization and FTCA lawsuit settlements that exceed a Justice Department attorney’s authority
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Executive branch officers with this broad authority over litigation
and settlements are in a position from which they might help favored
plaintiffs by ignoring statutory limits and defenses, pulling punches in
litigation, or settling claims for amounts unwarranted by the law and
289
facts. Narratives about whether government attorneys might abuse
that authority to benefit political allies vary with the writer and the
focus. Professor Todd David Peterson has forcefully suggested “there
is no reason to believe that a Department that is committed to an advocacy model in advising the President on his constitutional authority
would shrink from a settlement policy that permitted political judg290
Jeffrey Axelrad, the
ments to displace litigation risk assessments.”
former head of the Torts Branch in the Justice Department’s Civil Division, expressed a different view: “It is to the Justice Department
that the unpopular, hard task of guarding the [Judgment] Fund
against abuse falls. Eternal vigilance and reasoned, careful analysis
have been the hallmark of the Justice Department’s exercise of this
291
responsibility.”

289

290
291

must be formally approved by the Department of Justice officer with authority for that
amount. 28 C.F.R. § 14.6(c); JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 196, at § 15.05(1).
See Todd David Peterson, Protecting the Appropriations Power: Why Congress Should Care About
Settlements at the Department of Justice, 2009 BYU L. REV. 327, 331 (2009) (noting the secret
nature of government settlement analysis); see also id. at 349 (explaining that the Department of Justice “has the power to compromise and settle these claims for amounts that
may not reflect their legal merit but rather the desire of the executive branch to compensate plaintiffs whom they deem worthy”).
Id. at 331.
See Axelrad, supra note 4.
Certainly political pressure from within the executive branch has been applied with
the intent of opening the Judgment Fund. The previously discussed attempts of the Department of Transportation and the Department of Housing and Urban Development to
use the Judgment Fund to make EAJA payments had a political aspect. See supra 206–218
and accompanying text. So did efforts of the Department of Energy to help nuclear
weapons contractors secure FTCA coverage for their actions. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 98124, pt. 2, at 14–17 (1983) (letter from Dep’t of Energy General Counsel supporting contractors’ proposal). Executive branch officials in non-Justice agencies have done things
for political reasons that seemingly undermine the government’s position in pending tort
litigation. See Paul Figley, Ethical Intersections & the Federal Tort Claims Act: An Approach for
Government Attorneys, 8 ST. THOMAS U. L.J. 347, 368–70 (2011) (discussing actions of Secretary of Energy Hazel O’Leary during trial of FTCA suit brought by Nevada Test Site
workers alleging exposure to radiation). These sorts of things are different in kind from
Professor Peterson’s concern that Justice Department attorneys “may wish to compensate
plaintiffs for political reasons or because the administration favors the plaintiff’s cause,
even though the plaintiff’s legal claim is weak.” Peterson, supra note 289, at 331; see also
Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal Government
Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 951, 984–86 (1991) (discussing ethical obligations of civil government attorneys to raise all applicable defenses).
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b. Single Event Settlements
Government attorneys handling high profile cases, run-of-the-mill
litigation, and administrative claims have the authority to settle those
292
matters with Judgment Fund money. Department of Justice regula293
tions require documentation and approval of such settlements.
It is no secret that some private attorneys, acting to the detriment
of their clients, settle cases for more (or less) than is warranted by the
294
facts and the law. Their reasons range from fear of losing or being
295
embarrassed, to hope of hiding their poor preparation or lack of
296
qualifications, to desire to accommodate those with whom they will
have future dealings such as local lawyers or a judge who demands
297
There is also simple laziness and the wish to avoid the
settlement.
298
Lawyers may unconwork, time, and stress that a trial requires.
sciously merge their self-interest into their analysis of whether a case
299
should be tried.
Some government attorneys may wish to settle cases for similar
reasons. Two primary questions the Civil Division considers in determining whether to approve a proposed settlement are whether the
case is adequately prepared and whether settlement has been pro-

292
293
294

295

296

297

298

299

Peterson, supra note 289, at 349.
See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. Pt. 0, Subpt. Y, App., Civ. Div. Directive No. 1-10.
See Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers’ Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using Economics and
Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
269, 317–18 (1999) (noting that ethical rules are not always followed).
See Tom Galbraith, Lawyer Behavior for Survival and Elegance, 33 LITIGATION 8, 13 (2006)
(noting that some attorneys “can always find a rationale for settling a case he is afraid to
lose at trial”); Sternlight, supra note 294, at 317–18 (explaining that psychological factors
can impact an attorney’s motivation for settling a case).
John Lande, Escaping from Lawyers’ Prison of Fear, 82 UMKC L. REV. 485, 489 (2014); see also
Richard G. Spier, Professionalism in Mediation: Avoiding Common Pitfalls, OR. ST. B. BULL.,
(Nov. 2013), https://www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin/13nov/professionalism.html
(noting that opponents can sense when an attorney fears trial).
See Sternlight, supra note 294, at 328 (noting that attorneys may settle to foster amicable
relationships with opposing counsel or opposing parties); see also Patrick E. Longan, Bureaucratic Justice Meets ADR: The Emerging Role for Magistrates As Mediators, 73 NEB. L. REV.
712, 736 (1994) (recognizing that a “judge can play on the fears of the lawyers who have
other cases to come before that judge”).
Sternlight, supra note 294, at 328; see also LLOYD PAUL STRYKER, THE ART OF ADVOCACY
291 (1954) (noting that settlement is an option for attorney who “for personal reasons . . . would a little rather not submit to ordeal by combat”) (cited in Glenn E. Bradford, Losing, 58 J. MO. B. 208, 209 (2002)).
See Kevin C. McMunigal, The Cost of Settlement: The Impact of Scarcity of Adjudication on Litigation Lawyers, 37 UCLA L. REV. 833, 859 (1990) (noting susceptibility of inexperienced
lawyers); Sternlight, supra note 294, at 317–18 (noting the impact of psychological factors
on an attorney’s willingness to settle a case).
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posed because the attorney wants to avoid going to trial. 300 Documented examples where government attorneys have settled to avoid
trial are rare. One such case is White v. U.S. Department of the Interior,
in which an Assistant U.S. Attorney avoided an imminent trial by lying
to the judge, deceitfully stating that a $2,000,020 wrongful death set301
tlement had been approved by his “superiors in Washington.” This
lie was remarkable because it was sure to come to light “[w]hen pay302
It was
ment as required under the agreement was not received.”
discovered, a motion to enforce the unapproved settlement was de303
nied, and six months later, summary judgment was granted for the
304
government on liability.
305
It is easy to be generous with other people’s money, a truism
that might tempt a government attorney facing a very sympathetic
306
In the
plaintiff apparently barred from suing the government.
normal situation, a client’s interest in a favorable settlement would
counterbalance its attorney’s desire to settle for more (or less) than
the litigative value of the case. That is not the case when Judgment
Fund money is sought under a statute that does not require reimbursement because the client agency has no financial interest in the
307
Despite the ease with which such cases might be settled
outcome.
and the evident “incentive to yield to the perceived special need du
308
jour,” there is very little factual support for the notion that government attorneys inappropriately use the Judgment Fund to settle indi309
vidual claims or cases. This circumstance is attributable to the pro300

301
302
303
304
305

306
307
308
309

See generally 28 C.F.R. Pt. 0, Subpt. Y, App., Civil Div. Directive No. 1-10 § 2(b) (requiring a
“a detailed description of the matter, the United States Attorney’s recommendation, the
agency’s recommendation where applicable, and a full statement of the reasons therefor”).
See White v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 639 F. Supp. 82, 88–89 (M.D. Pa. 1986), aff’d, 815 F.2d
697 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting settlement conference transcript).
Id. at 84.
Id.
White v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 656 F. Supp. 25 (M.D. Pa. 1986), aff’d, 815 F.2d 697 (3d
Cir. 1987).
Cf. In re Erewhon, Inc., 21 B.R. 79, 81 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982) (“When dealing with other
people’s money, there is apt to be less regard for exercising the same scrutiny of charges
that one might render when dealing purely with one’s own expenses.”).
See generally Peterson, supra note 289, at 348 (discussing how “the worthiness of the cause
is not always congruent with the meritoriousness of the claim”).
See supra note 138 and accompanying text; see also Axelrad, supra note 4.
Axelrad, supra note 4.
But cf. infra Part III.2.c (discussing EAJA settlements in “sue and settle” litigation).
Professor Peterson identified as a possible example of executive branch overreach
the dispute regarding the return of money Pakistan paid for undelivered F-16 fighters.
Peterson, supra note 289, at 367–68. Pursuant to a U.S. Government approved contract,
in 1989 Pakistan paid General Dynamics $658,000,000 for the fighters; delivery of this
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fessionalism of those attorneys, 310 to the safeguards built into the system that require detailed written explanations of settlements and approval of larger settlements by attorneys not directly involved in the
311
litigation and, perhaps, to the difficulty of detecting settlements in
312
which it was done.
c. “Sue & Settle” Environmental Litigation
There are indications that the Judgment Fund has been used to
pay EAJA fees that should have been paid from agency appropria313
The proposed Equal Access to Justice Reform Act of 2003
tions.
recognized in its findings “the practice of Federal agencies of paying
their EAJA liabilities from the General Treasury rather than their own
agency budgets, relieving those agencies of the financial consequences of their misconduct (i.e., EAJA liability) and burdening the Feder314
al budget unnecessarily.” The availability of the Judgment Fund to
pay EAJA fees is part of the mix in “sue and settle” environmental liti315
gation.

310
311

312
313
314
315

military hardware was barred by statute when the President was “unable to certify that Pakistan had not developed nuclear weapons,” but the money was not returned. Id. at 367.
In 1998, prior to suit being filed, the Clinton Administration agreed to pay $324,600,000
from the Judgment Fund to settle Pakistan’s claim; Pakistan also received $142,300,000
from other sources. Id. The lack of specific information about the legal arguments
makes it difficult to analyze the merits of the decision to settle with Judgment Fund money. Id. at 368.
See Axelrad, supra note 4 (describing the role of Department of Justice attorneys in guarding against misuse of Judgment Fund money).
See, e.g., White, 639 F. Supp. at 88 (holding that failure to obtain required approvals made
a purported settlement invalid and unenforceable); 28 C.F.R. Pt. 0, Subpt. Y, App., Civil
Div. Directive No. 1-10 §§ 1, 2 (2014) (delegating settlement authority and requiring settlement memoranda).
See Peterson, supra note 289, at 369–73 (explaining why the judicial and legislative
branches are poorly situated to monitor for such settlements).
See Baier, supra note 226, at 35 n.265, 63 n.436 (noting that EAJA fees are not always paid
as the statute requires).
See H.R. 2282, § 2(a)(6), 108th Cong. (2003), quoted in Baier, supra note 226, at 61–63
n.433 (noting that a nearly identical bill was introduced in 2005).
See e.g., Regulatory Chaos: Finding Legislative Solutions to Benefit Jobs and the Economy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th Cong. 68 (2011)
(statement of William L. Kovacs, Senior Vice President, Environment, Technology and
Regulatory Affairs, U.S. Chamber of Commerce) (suggesting that agencies in “sue and
settle” litigation agree to pay attorney fees from the Judgment Fund); Jenna Greene, Feds
Paid Billions in Settlements Last Year, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 6, 2012 at 2 (noting use of Judgment
Fund to pay attorneys’ fees in “sue and settle” cases); Jillian Kay Melchior, The Enviro-Fix Is
In, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (May 23, 2013), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/
349111/enviro-fix-jillian-kay-melchior (referencing the use of the Judgment Fund to pay
attorneys’ fees).
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For an agency entering a “sue and settle” settlement, a key issue is
whether plaintiff’s expenses and attorneys’ fees will be paid from the
Judgment Fund or agency appropriations. Under EAJA, if a feeshifting statute or the common law creates a right to such fees from
the United States, those fees would be paid from the Judgment Fund
unless the basis of the award is that the agency acted in “bad faith,” in
316
If no such feewhich case they would be paid from agency funds.
shifting statute or common law right applies, EAJA fees can be paid to
317
a prevailing party, but only from agency appropriations and only if
318
When a suit
the agency’s position was not “substantially justified.”
involves both statutes that authorize attorneys’ fees and those that do
not, the Office of Legal Counsel determined that all fees should be
allotted to the statute authorizing fees (and be paid from the Judgment Fund) if claims under the statues were closely related and con319
If the claims are
tributed to a successful, significant prosecution.
unrelated, fees are allotted between agency appropriations and the
320
Judgment Fund.
In analyzing whether the Judgment Fund has been misused, the
interesting question is how the source of funding decision is made
when the answer is not obvious: how is it decided whether fees will
be paid from the Judgment Fund or agency appropriations when a
settlement involves claims involving different facts and statutes such
that work on one issue did not impact the other, or when there is
some indication that the agency acted in “bad faith” or was “substantially justified” in its position? It appears that this decision is typically
321
As Bureau of
made when the parties negotiate the settlement.
316
317
318
319

320

321

28 U.S.C. § 2412(b), (c)(2).
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), (d)(4) (for cases in litigation); 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1); 28
U.S.C. § 2412(c), (d)(3), (d)(4) (for administrative adjudications).
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), (B), (d)(3).
Payment of Attorney’s Fees in Litigation Involving Successful Challenges to Federal
Agency Action Arising Under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Citizen Suit Provisions of the Endangered Species Act [ESA], 24 Op. O.L.C. 311, 314 (2000).
See id. at 321 (“Under this approach, hours and costs necessary to both counts should be
assigned to the [agency appropriation] for attorneys’ fees purposes, leaving only the
hours and costs necessary only to the APA claim to be paid [from the Judgment Fund].”);
see also Payment of Attorney’s Fees and Cost in Jean M. Kovalich v. Defense Investigative Service, B231771, (Comp. Gen. Dec. 7, 1988) (concluding that EAJA settlement of attorneys’ fees
must be paid from agency appropriation although related back-pay award was paid from
the Judgment Fund).
See e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-650, ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION:
CASES AGAINST EPA AND ASSOCIATED COSTS OVER TIME 22 (2011) [hereinafter GAO-11650] (noting that “[a]s part of the payment process, Justice negotiated payment amounts
with prevailing parties”); Baier, supra note 226, at 46 (noting EAJA fees are frequently settled in an addendum to a stipulation identifying a prevailing party “or as part of the over-
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Land Management Director Robert Abbey explained, in practice
“[the money] can come out of either fund. . . . It is part of the nego322
tiations, it is part of the settlement discussion.” Those negotiations
typically include plaintiff’s counsel and attorneys from both the
323
agency and the Department of Justice. The prevalent expectation is
that most environmental fee awards will be paid by the Judgment
324
The most detailed information available is in a 2011 GovFund.
ernment Accountability Office study that examined EAJA payments
325
Its included tables show that from December
made in EPA cases.
326
the Judgment Fund paid
2005 through September 2010,
$8,379,302.63, or 86% of the total awarded in those cases, while EPA
327
appropriations paid $1,371,228, amounting to 14%.
Deciding the source of payment decision in settlement negotiations is troublesome unless the government attorneys are scrupulous
in assessing which statute properly authorizes the payment. The
Judgment Fund statute is limited to paying awards “not otherwise
328
provided for.” A key principal of appropriations law is that “[t]here
is only one proper source of funds in any given case. There is no
329
election to be made.” Parties cannot properly stipulate or agree to
330
The reachange which government account will pay a settlement.
son is clear: allowing them to do so “might encourage settlements

322

323

324
325
326

327

328
329
330

all settlement”); Korpics et al., supra note 229, at 10990 (explaining that either a consent
decree or judgment is necessary for an award of fees).
See Conserving America’s Land and Heritage: Department of the Interior FY 2011 Budget Request:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Interior, Environment and Related Agencies of the H. Comm. on
Appropriations, pt. 6, 111th Cong. 86 (2010) [hereinafter Interior FY 2011 Budget Hrg.],
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg66892/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg66892.pdf
(answering the question of whether EAJA fees “come out of your [BLM] budget or . . .
out of the Judgment fund . . . ?”).
See id. at 87 (statement of Director Abbey regarding BLM settlements); see also GAO-11650, supra note 321, at 25 (noting that the Justice Department frequently attempts to negotiate attorneys’ fees rather than litigate them).
See GAO-11-650, supra note 321, at 22 (agreeing as to “most claims”); Korpics et al., supra
note 229, at 10996 (agreeing as to “virtually all fee awards”).
See generally GAO-11-650, supra note 321, at 3–5.
See id. at 40–49 (referencing ten pages of tables listing, inter alia, case names, plaintiffs,
and amounts paid); see also id. at 4 (noting that the report covered the period for which
relevant EPA payment data were available).
See id. at 40–49 (calculating the sums by adding payments); see also Ron Arnold, How
Washington Pays Big Green to Sue the Government, WASH. EXAMINER, Aug. 23, 2011,
http://washingtonexaminer.com/how-washington-pays-big-green-to-sue-thegovernment/article/40827 (using the tables in the GAO report to calculate that 82% of
the money paid went to environmental organizations).
31 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(1).
2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-40.
CRS JUDGMENT FUND, supra note 193, at 10.
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driven by source-of-funds considerations rather than the best interests
331
of the United States.” Government attorneys negotiating EAJA settlements must balance fealty to the Judgment Fund and the agency’s
interest in preserving program funds. In a three-attorney conversation, agency counsel and plaintiff’s attorney may have common
ground to advocate for payment from the Judgment Fund; that would
332
conserve agency appropriations and meet plaintiff’s desire for fees.
Indeed, in a slightly different field a respected treatise advises that to
preserve access to the Judgment Fund consent decrees should avoid
333
The available information does not show how
mentioning EAJA.
conscientious the Justice Department has been in considering and
protecting the Judgment Fund when it enters or approves fee settlements with environmental organizations.
d. Class Settlements & Program Creation
On occasion, issues involving “creative” use of the Judgment
Fund have arisen in a class action context. Examples of such litigation where political concerns may have tempered the government’s
334
defense include the Pigford black farmer litigation, the Japanese
335
Latin Americans litigation, and suits brought by Native American
336
farmers, Hispanic farmers, and female farmers.
The Pigford black farmer litigation had two discrete phases, both
arising from allegations that black farmers were treated unfairly in
USDA programs for loans, crop payments, disaster payments, and in
337
Pigford I began in August 1997,
investigations of those allegations.
331
332

333

334
335
336

337

2008 GAO PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 14-35 (citing 13
Op. O.L.C. 118, 125 (1989)).
See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Commercial And Administrative Law of the H. Comm.
on The Judiciary on H.R. 1996, 112th Cong. 8 (2011) (statement of Jeffrey Axelrad, Professorial Lecturer in Law, George Washington University Law School) (noting that an agency involved in EAJA fee settlement has no incentive to reduce payments from the Judgment Fund).
See RONALD A. KIENLEN, GOVERNMENT CONTRACT DISPUTES § 9:9 Consent Judgments
(2013 ed.) (explaining that for consent judgments “to avoid difficulties with payments
from the judgment fund . . . it is best to avoid reference to [EAJA] fees and interest”).
See generally Peterson, supra note 289, at 358–62 (describing the “case famously known as
the Black Farmers case”).
See generally id. at 362–66 (discussing the Japanese Latin American case).
See generally JODY FEDER & TADLOCK COWAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40988, GARCIA V.
VILSACK: A POLICY AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A USDA DISCRIMINATION CASE 1 (2013) [hereinafter CRS GARCIA ANALYSIS] (describing the minority and female farmer litigation
against the USDA).
See, e.g., Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 85–88 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d, 206 F.3d 1212
(D.C. Cir. 2000), enforcement denied sub nom., Pigford v. Schafer, 536 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C.
2008); TADLOCK COWAN & JODY FEDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20430, THE PIGFORD
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when Timothy Pigford filed suit under the Equal Credit Opportunity
338
Act (“ECOA”) seeking class relief. In October 1998, the court certified a class “for purposes of determining liability” and injunctive re339
Although plaintiffs’ claims had some apparent merit, 340 many
lief.
341
The Justice Dewere barred by the ECOA’s statute of limitations.
partment Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) was asked whether the
government could waive the limitations defense and settle the
342
OLC reasoned that because the statute of limitations was
claims.
part of the terms of the consent to the waiver of sovereign immunity
“established by Congress,” “modifying the terms of consent re343
It concluded, “ECOA’s statute of limiquire[d] legislative action.”
tations applies to both administrative and litigative settlements of
344
ECOA claims, and it may not be waived by the executive branch.”
Congress resolved this jurisdictional problem by including a targeted
waiver of the statute of limitations in an appropriations bill that became law on October 21, 1998, effectively authorizing plaintiffs’
345
claims.

338
339
340

341
342
343
344

345

CASES: USDA SETTLEMENT OF DISCRIMINATION SUITS BY BLACK FARMERS 2 (2013) [hereinafter CRS PIGFORD CASES]; see generally Sharon LaFraniere, U.S. Opens Spigot After Farmers
Claim Discrimination, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/
26/us/farm-loan-bias-claims-often-unsupported-cost-us-millions.html (providing a thorough discussion of the litigation and the politics surrounding it).
See CRS PIGFORD CASES, supra note 337, at 2 (noting that a similar suit was later filed by
Cecil Brewington).
Pigford v. Glickman, 182 F.R.D. 341, 351–52 (D.D.C. 1998), modifying the class in Pigford v.
Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 92 (D.D.C.1999).
See CRS PIGFORD CASES, supra note 337, at 2 (noting that the discrimination claims were
corroborated by a 1994 USDA-commissioned study). But cf. LaFraniere, supra note 337,
at 5 (noting that two 1997 government reports did not find “evidence of ongoing, systemic discrimination”).
See 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(f) (stating that the statute of limitations is five years with some exceptions).
Statute of Limitations & Settlement of Equal Credit Opportunity Act Discrimination
Claims Against the Dep’t of Agric., 22 Op. O.L.C. 11, 1998 WL 1180049, at *1 (1998).
Id. at *3.
Id. at *15. OLC also concluded that the statute of limitations was not subject to equitable
tolling. Id. at *14. This conclusion was affirmed in a subsequent OLC opinion. See generally Waiver of Statutes of Limitations in Connection with Claims Against the Dep’t of
Agric., 22 Op. O.L.C. 127 (1998).
See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub.
L. No. 105-277, § 741, 112 Stat. 2681 (waiving the statute of limitations); id. at § 741(e)
(indicating that the waiver applied only to “nonemployment related complaint[s] that
w[ere] filed with the Department of Agriculture before July 1, 1997 and allege[] discrimination at any time during the period beginning on January 1, 1981 and ending December 31, 1996 . . . .”).
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The newly extended statute of limitations 346 and the 1998 decision
347
that certified plaintiffs’ class made a negotiated settlement practi348
cable. In April of 1999, the court approved a consent decree establishing a multi-track claims process that gave Track A plaintiffs who
had “little or no documentary evidence . . . a virtually automatic cash
payment of $50,000,” and allowed those with better evidence to re349
cover in Track B whatever damages they could establish. The consent decree laid out specific procedures and administrators’ respon350
It defined what Track A claimants must establish by
sibilities.
substantial evidence to an independent adjudicator who would de351
cide on the papers. Track B claimants had to show discrimination
by a preponderance of the evidence; they could present evidence and
352
the government could cross-examine and argue. Either side could
353
Attorneys’ fees and expetition for reexamination of a decision.
penses were paid under fee shifting statutes rather than from the set354
tlement. Claimants were to submit claims by October 12, 1999, with
provision for late-filing claimants to file by September 15, 2000, upon
a showing that “extraordinary circumstances” caused the late submis355
The cash settlements, exceeding $770,000,000, were paid
sion.
356
from the Judgment Fund.

346
347
348

349
350

351

352
353
354

355
356

Id.
See Pigford v. Glickman, 182 F.R.D. 341, 350–52 (D.D.C. 1998) (certifying the class pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2)).
See Stephen Carpenter, The USDA Discrimination Cases: Pigford, In Re Black Farmers,
Keepseagle, Garcia, and Love, 17 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 1, 15–16 (2012) (noting the previous
problem posed by the statute of limitations).
Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 95 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d, 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir.
2000) and enforcement denied sub nom., Pigford v. Schafer, 536 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2008).
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06469R, PIGFORD SETTLEMENT: THE ROLE
OF THE COURT-APPOINTED MONITOR 5–9 (2006) [hereinafter GAO-06469R] (summarizing Pigford I consent decree procedures); Carpenter, supra note 348, at 18–19 (same).
See Carpenter, supra note 348, at 18–19 (explaining that an independent adjudicator
would decide claims based on a determination that the claimant’s paper record met a
substantial evidence burden).
See GAO-06469R, supra note 350, at 9 (explaining the burden claimants must meet in a
Track B claim and the ways in which the government can challenge these claims).
See id. (explaining the process for challenging an adjudication by filing a petition with a
monitor).
See Carpenter, supra note 348, at 20 (explaining that fees for the class counsel were determined by fee shifting statutes, rather than by taking a percentage of the payment made
to the class).
See CRS PIGFORD CASES, supra note 337, at 4.
See id. at 3, 6 (indicating that the settlement was paid from the Judgment Fund). Total
benefits exceeded $1,000,000,000. Id. at 7. Track B claimants recovered between $52,000
and $1,500,000. See GAO-06469R, supra note 350, at 9.
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A large number of the late claims were not resolved on their mer357
its; only 2,116 of 73,800 late claims were allowed to proceed. Dissatisfaction with these outcomes led to political efforts to reopen the
358
Finally, Congress included in the 2008 Farm Bill a new
process.
359
procedure for those claims to be decided “on the merits.” Congress
set the maximum amount to be paid under the new statute, and ap360
The subsequent suits
propriated for that purpose, $100,000,000.
were consolidated in Pigford II and the parties agreed to a
361
$1,250,000,000 settlement in February 2010. The claims process es362
tablished in the Pigford II settlement was similar to that in Pigford I.
It differed in that neither side could appeal and attorneys’ fees and
363
Because the
expenses came from the settlement’s lump sum.
Judgment Fund can be used only to make payments “not otherwise
364
provided for” and Congress had appropriated money in the 2008
farm bill to pay the Pigford II claims, the Judgment Fund could not be
365
Several attempts to appropriate the
used to pay the settlement.
366
In late
$1,150,000,000 needed to complete the settlement failed.
2010, Congress enacted the Claims Resolution Act of 2010 that appropriated the money for Pigford II and authorized payment of
$2,000,000,000 from the Judgment Fund for the Cobell v. Salazar class
action settlement regarding government mismanagement of hun367
dreds of thousands of Individual Indian Money trust accounts.
357
358
359

360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367

See CRS PIGFORD CASES, supra note 337, at 5 (noting that 66,000 late claims were submitted
by the September 15 deadline).
See LaFraniere, supra note 337, at 11 (noting nine years of “concerted effort”).
See Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 14012(b), 122
Stat. 1651 (“Any Pigford claimant who has not previously obtained a determination on
the merits of a Pigford claim may, in a civil action brought in the United States Distict
Court for the District of Columbia, obtain that determination.”); CRS PIGFORD CASES, supra note 337, at 7.
See Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 §§ 14012(c)(2), 14012(i)(1).
CRS PIGFORD CASES, supra note 337, at 7.
See Carpenter, supra note 348, at 29–31 (describing the Pigford II claims process).
See id. at 31 (noting authority for a court-appointed ombudsman).
31 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(1); see supra notes 141–42 and accompanying text.
See CRS PIGFORD CASES, supra note 337, at 7–8 (noting that Congress had appropriated
$100,000,000 for Pigford II claims in the 2008 Farm Bill).
See id. at 10–11 (discussing unsuccessful legislative efforts).
Claims Resolution Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-291 § 201, 124 Stat. 3064 (2010); see also
Armen H. Merjian, An Unbroken Chain of Injustice: The Dawes Act, Native American Trusts,
and Cobell v. Salazar, 46 GONZAGA L. REV. 609, 620–21 (2010/2011) (describing the
number and nature of the trust accounts). The Cobell litigation had a long, complicated,
and contentious history. See Cobell v. Salazar, 573 F.3d 808, 810 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (noting
the case was then in its thirteenth year with an “increasingly difficult to summarize . . . factual and procedural background”); Merjian, supra at 619–54 (providing a
thorough summary of the litigation); see also Jamin B. Raskin, Professor Richard J. Pierce’s
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The Pigford litigation is not an example of executive branch overreach, although a strong political current ran through the settlement
368
President Bill Clinton and President Barack Obama
negotiations.
favored the farmers’ claims, and their political appointees actively
supported the settlements over the objections of some career offi369
cials. But the payments were made in a manner that respected the
Judgment Fund. The settlement in Pigford I was appropriately paid
from the Judgment Fund because Congress allowed the suit when it
370
extended the ECOA statute of limitations. In contrast, the Pigford II
settlement was not paid from the Judgment Fund because the stat371
Conute’s “not otherwise provided for” requirement was not met.
gress appropriated money for the Pigford II settlement with full
knowledge of the terms of the agreement.
The same analysis applies to another case where political concerns
may have influenced the Department of Justice’s settlement position,
372
that of the Japanese Latin Americans. The plaintiffs were people of
Japanese ancestry living in Latin America who were interred during
373
World War II in the United States at its request. Plaintiffs sought to
374
make claims under the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, the statute that
authorized a formal apology and payment of $20,000 to Japanese
375
The governAmericans who had been interred during the war.
ment had a strong defense to claims of the Japanese Latin Americans
because the statute authorized compensation only to “a United States
376
Nonetheless, the governcitizen or a permanent resident alien.”
ment agreed to settle each plaintiff’s claim for an apology and $5,000,

368
369
370
371

372
373
374
375
376

Reign of Error in the Administrative Law Review, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 229, 242–43 (2005) (addressing particular actions of the judge initially assigned the case).
See generally LaFraniere, supra note 337 (providing a thorough discussion of the black
farmer ligation, its political aspects, and its susceptibility to fraud).
See id. at 6 (quoting an attorney statement that the settlement “was more a political decision than a litigation decision”).
See Peterson, supra note 289, at 362 (noting with approval that this process respected
“Congress’s appropriation authority”).
31 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(1); see also CRS PIGFORD CASES, supra note 337, at 7–8 (explaining that
the “not otherwise provided for” requirement was not met because in the 2008 farm bill,
Congress had made $100 million available for those claims).
See Peterson, supra note 289, at 362–66 (citing Mochizuki v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 54
(1998)).
See id. at 362–63 (describing the removal of Japanese Latin Americans to the United
States).
See generally Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 904 (codified at 50
U.S.C. § 1989b).
Id.; Peterson, supra note 289, at 365–66.
Civil Liberties Act of 1988 § 108(2)(A); see Peterson, supra note 289, at 366 (explaining
further that the Japanese-Latin Americans were not eligible for redress payments under
that provision).

194

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 18:1

to be paid from the Civil Liberties Public Education Fund. 377 The settlement had political overtones and it may have been entered over
378
But, bethe objections of some within the Department of Justice.
cause the Civil Liberties Public Education Fund was depleted, the settlement was funded only when Congress appropriated $4,300,000 to
379
fund it. Accordingly, like the Pigford and Cobell litigation, in the end
the executive branch paid only money Congress had appropriated for
that purpose.
The Obama Administration followed a different path in other
380
381
cases. Native-American farmers, Hispanic farmers, and women
382
farmers filed class action suits against USDA alleging unlawful discrimination and ECOA claims similar to those raised in the Pigford lit383
In the context of settling those cases the Administration
igation.
used Judgment Fund money to fully fund claims processes that were
384
As explained
similar to those established in the Pigford litigation.
below, the amounts paid from the Judgment Fund for these programs seem out of proportion to the government’s litigative risk.
In the Keepseagle litigation, Native Americans brought a class action suit alleging USDA discrimination in reviewing applications for
377

378

379

380
381
382

383

384

Mochizuki, 41 Fed. Cl. at 56–57; Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Japanese Latin Americans to Receive Compensation for Internment During World War II (June 12, 1998),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/1998/June/276.htm.html. This fund was established by
§ 104 of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988.
See Peterson, supra note 289, at 366 (quoting the Justice Management Division General
Counsel, who wrote that he saw “virtually no litigative risk” regarding the situation with
the Japanese-Latin Americans).
See 1999 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-31, 113 Stat. 57,
100 § 3021; Peterson, supra note 289, at 366 n.194 (suggesting that Congress “had little
choice but to [appropriate the money]”).
See Keepseagle v. Glickman, 194 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2000) (denying a motion to assign
case to the judge who had approved the consent decree in Pigford I).
See Garcia v. Veneman, 211 F.R.D. 15, 17 (D.D.C. 2002) (denying class certification of
Hispanic farmers).
See Love v. Veneman, 224 F.R.D. 240, 242 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d in part, remanded in part sub
nom. Love v. Johanns, 439 F.3d 723 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (denying class certification of female
farmers).
See In re Veneman, 309 F.3d 789, 791–92 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (noting similarity of the four
cases); CRS GARCIA ANALYSIS, supra note 336, at 1 (acknowledging allegations of discrimination by these groups). All three groups were specifically identified in a non-binding
“sense of Congress” provision in the 2008 Farm Bill which urged “an expeditious and
just” resolution of pending farmer discrimination claims against USDA. See Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 14011, 122 Stat. 923 (identifying
“Native American, Hispanic, and female farmers or ranchers, based on racial, ethnic, or
gender discrimination in farm program participation”); CRS GARCIA ANALYSIS, supra note
336, at 12–13.
See Carpenter, supra note 348, at 13–32 (discussing similarities and differences in claims
procedures).

Oct. 2015]

THE JUDGMENT FUND

195

farm loans or benefits programs and in investigating complaints of
385
386
They sought equitable and monetary relief and
discrimination.
387
In
incorrectly designated the Pigford litigation as a related matter.
2001, Judge Emmett G. Sullivan “certifie[d] plaintiffs’ class only as to
plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief” and deferred
388
the question of certifying a class seeking monetary relief. In 2010,
389
including
the parties agreed to a $760,000,000 settlement,
390
$680,000,000 paid from the Judgment Fund.
The Keepseagle settlement agreement, a forty-seven page docu391
ment, established “an administrative claims process” similar to the
392
Pigford process. It spelled out procedures for a two-tier, non-judicial
process that included requirements for class membership, facts a
claimant must establish to recover under Track A or B, and directives
393
for how to evaluate each claim. The Track A procedures provided
that a claimant would recover $50,000 cash upon showing of a basic
claim to a neutral arbiter who would review a paper record on a substantial evidence standard; USDA could not provide records or ar394
guments to dispute the claim. Track B claimants could recover up
to $250,000 in an arbitration in which they had a preponderance of
395
the evidence burden of proof. The settlement also required USDA

385
386
387
388

389
390

391

392
393
394
395

See In re Veneman, 309 F.3d at 791 (noting plaintiffs had proceeded under ECOA, Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Administrative Procedures Act).
Id.
See Keepseagle v. Glickman, 194 F.R.D. 1, 1 (D.D.C. 2000) (rejecting plaintiffs’ designation of their case as related to the Pigford litigation).
Keepseagle v. Veneman, No. Civ.A.9903119EGS1712, 2001 WL 34676944, at *14 (D.D.C.
Dec. 12, 2001); see also CRS GARCIA ANALYSIS, supra note 348, at 11 (summarizing the
case).
CRS GARCIA ANALYSIS, supra note 348, at 11.
News Release No. 0539.10, U.S. Dept. of Agric., Agriculture Secretary Vilsack and Attorney
General Holder Announce Settlement Agreement with Native American Farmers Who Claim to Have
Faced Discrimination by USDA in Past Decades (Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.usda.
gov/wps/portal/usda/usdamediafb?contentid=2010/10/0539.xml&printable=true&cont
entidonly=true.
Settlement Agreement, Keepseagle v. Vilsack, No. 99-3119 2015 WL 1969814 (D.D.C. May
4, 2015) [hereinafter Keepseagle Settlement Agreement], http://www.indianfarmclass.
com/Documents/SettlementAgreement.pdf.
See Love v. Vilsack, 908 F. Supp. 2d 139, 142–43 (D.D.C. 2012) (noting the process was
“similar, though not identical”).
Keepseagle Settlement Agreement, supra note 391, at 9–10, 14–25.
Id. at 7, 21–23.
Id. at 7, 23.
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to undertake a number of steps to improve services to and communi396
cations with Native American farmers.
The Keepseagle settlement did not reflect the strength of the government’s litigative position. Because the plaintiffs’ class had not
been certified for monetary relief, plaintiffs faced the prospect of hav397
Such a failed class action
ing to separately litigate each claim.
398
Nonetheless, the
would typically have very little settlement value.
government settled for $760,000,000 (including a Settlement Fund of
$680,000,000) which, according to plaintiffs’ attorneys, gave plaintiffs
399
“about 98% of what [they] could possibly have won at trial….” This
proved to be a vast overpayment. Although the complaint had pre400
dicted at least 19,000 claimants, only 4,472 farmers perfected their
401
claims. A total of $299,999,288 was paid from the Settlement Fund
402
that had been established with Judgment Fund money, leaving
403
404
The parties had
$380,000,712 at the end of the claims process.
405
Because
expected the remainder to be only “a couple of million.”
no provision had been included in the settlement agreement for re406
version of excess money to the United States and the remainder was

396

397

398

399
400
401

402

403
404
405
406

See id. at 33–38 (enhancing existing programs and creating a Council for Native American
Farming, a USDA ombudsman for Native American and other socially disadvantaged
farmers, and new reporting requirements).
See Garcia v. Veneman, 224 F.R.D. 8, 16 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d and remanded sub nom. Garcia
v. Johanns, 444 F.3d 625 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting difficulty of resolving similar ECOA
claims even after class certification for liability in the Pigford litigation).
See Scott E. Gant, The Law of Unintended Consequences: Supreme Court Jurisdiction Over Interlocutory Class Certification Rulings, 6 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 249, 249 (2004) (noting that
“denial of certification often means the end of the case”); Barry Sullivan & Amy Kobelski
Trueblood, Rule 23(f): A Note on Law and Discretion in the Courts of Appeals, 246 F.R.D. 277,
279 (2008) (“[C]lass certification decisions may make or break a case: Where a class is
not certified, the plaintiffs (and their lawyer) may not have the will—or the resources—to
continue with a litigation that [may] yield only a small recovery and little basis for an
award of substantial attorneys’ fees.”).
See Keepseagle, COHEN MILSTEIN, http://www.cohenmilstein.com/cases/95/keepseagle
(last visited Aug. 21, 2015) (alluding to plaintiffs’ economist’s report).
Fifth Amended Class Action Complaint at 163 ¶ 143, Keepseagle v. Vilsack, No. 99-CV03199, 2001 WL 35985330 (D.D.C. June 27, 2001).
Plaintiffs’ Status Report at 1, Keepseagle v. Vilsack, No. 99-CV-03199 (D.D.C. June 12,
2013) (reporting 4380 Track A and 92 Track B final determinations, 57 untimely claims,
and 731 defective or incomplete claims).
Plaintiffs’ Status Report at 2–3, Keepseagle v. Vilsack, No. 99-CV-03199 (D.D.C. Aug. 30,
2013) (reporting 3587 Track A claims [$224,187,500], 14 Track B claims [$3,364,647],
service awards to named plaintiffs [$950,000], and attorneys’ fees and costs
[$60,800,000]).
Id. at 3.
Status Conference at 4, Keepseagle v. Vilsack, No. 99-CV-03199 (D.D.C. Nov. 18, 2013).
Id. (comment of plaintiffs’ counsel).
Id. at 16 (comment of plaintiffs’ counsel).
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so large, the parties faced a conundrum with how to dispose of it. 407
The significant point from the Judgment Fund perspective is that
over $380,000,000 from the Judgment Fund, more than half the set408
tlement amount, will be used for some purpose other than paying
409
class members’ claims.
410
411
In Garcia v. Veneman and Love v. Veneman, class action suits
similar to Pigford and Keepseagle were filed by Hispanic farmers and
woman farmers, respectively. Garcia and Love, both alleging discrimination in farm loans and benefits programs and in investigation of
complaints of discrimination, were assigned to the same judge and
412
followed a similar path. In both cases, the district courts’ decisions
413
to deny class certification were affirmed on appeal. With the January 19, 2010 Supreme Court denial of certiorari on those decisions,
the only means left for a Garcia or Love plaintiff to pursue an ECOA
414
For the
claim would have been to litigate each claim individually.
next year, the Department of Justice declined to settle Garcia or Love
on a class-wide basis but expressed willingness to settle individual
415
claims.
407

408

409

410
411
412
413

414
415

See Keepseagle v. Vilsack, No. 99-CV-03199, 2015 WL 1969814 at *2 (D.D.C. May 4, 2015)
(discussing history of the settlement agreement); Keepseagle v. Vilsack, 307 F.R.D. 233,
238 (D.D.C. 2014) (noting disagreement among Native American groups as to how to
handle excess funds).
See Status Conference at 29, Keepseagle v. Vilsack, No. 99-CV-03199 (D.D.C. Nov. 18,
2013) (noting that fact and commenting that it “was shocking . . . [that the projected settlement amount] happens to be off $380 million dollars”).
As Judge Sullivan observed in denying a motion to modify the settlement, “[a]lthough a
$380,000,000 donation by the federal government to charities serving Native American
farmers and ranchers might well be in the public interest, the Court doubts that the
judgment fund from which this money came was intended to serve such a purpose.”
Keepseagle v. Vilsack, No. CV 99-3119 (EGS), 2015 WL 4510837, at *3 (D.D.C. July 24,
2015).
211 F.R.D. 15, 17–18 (D.D.C. 2002).
224 F.R.D. 240, 241–42 (D.D.C. 2004).
See CRS GARCIA ANALYSIS, supra note 336, at 11 (noting cases’ common history).
See Love, 224 F.R.D. at 242 (denying class certification for lack of commonality), aff’d in
part, remanded in part sub nom. Love v. Johanns, 439 F.3d 723 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Garcia v.
Veneman, 224 F.R.D. 8, 15–16 (D.D.C. 2004) (denying class certification for lack of
commonality), aff’d and remanded sub nom. Garcia v. Johanns, 444 F.3d 625, 637 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (affirming because “the failure to investigate a discrimination complaint is not a
‘credit transaction’ within the meaning of ECOA”). Both cases were remanded for determination of whether a failure to investigate violated the Administrative Procedure Act.
Love, 439 F.3d at 733; Garcia, 444 F.3d at 637. The district court’s decisions against plaintiffs on that issue were affirmed in a consolidated appeal. Garcia v. Vilsack, 563 F.3d 519,
521 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, Garcia v. Vilsack, 558 U.S. 1158 (2010).
CRS GARCIA ANALYSIS, supra note 336, at 8.
Id. at 6; see also Timothy J. Burger, DOJ and Agriculture Spar Over Hispanic Farmers Settlement,
http://www.mainjustice.com/2010/05/03/doj-andMAIN JUSTICE (May 3, 2010),
agriculture-spar-over-hispanic-farmers-settlement/ (quoting Justice spokesperson as say-
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On February 25, 2011, USDA and the Department of Justice unilaterally announced a claims program for Hispanic farmers and female farmers, including “at least $1.33 billion from the Judgment
Fund, plus $160 million in debt relief, to implement a unified, non416
On January 25, 2012, the govjudicial claims resolution process.”
417
The charter for this system is
ernment announced a revised plan.
the “Framework for Hispanic or Female Farmer’s Claims” (“Frame418
The Framework was similar to the Pigford and Keepseagle
work”).
processes but “differed in several respects, including the absence of
judicial supervision or class counsel, less monetary relief, a more onerous burden of proof, and relief for a more limited category of
419
It had two tiers, with awards capped at $50,000 and
claims.”
420
$250,000. The Framework is nineteen pages long and provided, inter alia, for: voluntary participation by claimants who may choose to
instead pursue a judicial remedy; an independent adjudicator to decide claims on a written record; written responses by the agency; and
421
Attorneys’ fees were to be paid by the claimno right to appeal.
422
The Framework provided that “[c]ash awards and tax relief
ant.
423
will be paid from the Judgment Fund.”
The litigative risk posed by Garcia and Love hardly justified the
government’s decision to establish this $1,333,000,000 claims pro-

416

417

418

419
420
421
422
423

ing that because of the denial of class certification “we will not be able to negotiate a
class-wide settlement”).
Secretary Vilsack’s Efforts to Address Discrimination at USDA, USDA OFFICE OF THE ASST. SECT.
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, http://www.ascr.usda.gov/about_cr_background.html (last visited on
May 29, 2015); News Transcript, Release No. 0100.11 USDA Office of Communications,
Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack and Assistant Attorney General Tony West Announce
Process to Resolve Discrimination Claims of Hispanic and Women Farmers (Feb. 25,
2011) http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentid=2011/03/0100.xml.
(last visited on Aug. 22, 2015).
News Release No. 0024.12, USDA Office of Communications, Agriculture Secretary Vilsack
Announces Updated and Improved Process to Resolve Discrimination Claims of Hispanic and Women Farmers (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentid=
2012/01/0024.xml (last visited on Aug. 22, 2015).
Framework for Hispanic or Female Farmer’s Claims, Defendant’s Eighth Status Rept.,
Exh. Garcia v. Vilsack, 1:00-cv-02445 (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2012), https://www.
farmerclaims.gov/Documents/USDA%20Framework%20011312%20Final.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2015)); see also Cantu v. United States, 565 F. App’x 7, 8–9 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(reversing dismissal of claim of discrimination in making settlement offer).
Id. at 9.
See CRS GARCIA ANALYSIS, supra note 336, at 8.
See Framework for Hispanic or Female Farmer’s Claims Process §§ V. D., IV, VII. C., VII.C.
(explaining procedures).
See id. § XI.
Id. § I.E. (providing further that USDA would pay administrative costs of the Claims Process).
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gram: the number of claimants was not known and a substantial final
payout in the cases was unlikely. First, when Secretary Tom Vilsack
announced the Hispanic and women farmers’ settlement process on
February 25, 2010, the government did not know how many claimants
there would be. At a status conference the previous week, government counsel had pressed plaintiffs’ counsel in Garcia for the number
of Hispanic claimants, noting that their allegations had ranged from
424
In September 2010, the gov20,000, to 50, to 82,000, to 16,000.
425
Second, no class was
ernment still did not have that information.
certified. In Pigford, class certification had been a key factor in the
426
By contrast, in both
government’s decision to settle that lawsuit.
Garcia and Love certification was denied, making the prospect of size427
The government’s interest in volable adverse judgments remote.
untarily settling thousands of claims was not anticipated by the court,
428
Nevertheless, in 2010 the govern“given the history of the case.”
ment created “what it’s calling an ‘Administrative Claims Program’”
as a “voluntary alternative to litigation” available to all Hispanic and
women farmers, not just those in contact with the Garcia and Love at429
torneys.
From all appearances, politics provided a key motivation for creation of the Hispanic or Female Farmer’s Claims Process. Following
the Pigford II settlement the Administration was under intense pressure from congressional leaders and Secretary Vilsack to compensate
430
Eight senators sent PresiHispanic farmers in a similar manner.
dent Obama a letter noting that “approximately $2.25 billion” had
been allotted to “resolve USDA discrimination against black farmers”

424

425

426

427
428
429
430

Status Conf. at 5, 10, Garcia v. Veneman, 1:00-cv-02445 (D.D.C. Feb. 19, 2010) (reasoning
that without “a solid number” a government settlement proposal would be “shooting in
the dark”).
Def. Status Rept. at 2, Garcia v. Veneman, 1:00-cv-02445 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2010) (noting
that plaintiffs’ counsel had identified only the eighty-one plaintiffs named in the Complaint).
CRS GARCIA ANALYSIS, supra note 336, at 6 (noting that “approval of class certification . . . appears to have been a critical factor in the decision” to settle); see Carpenter, supra note 348, at 15–16 (describing class certification as an “important development”
that “paved the way” for the settlement).
See Gant, supra note 398, at 249 (noting that in class action litigation “denial of certification often means the end of the case”).
Status Conf. at 11–12, Garcia v. Veneman, 1:00-cv-02445 (D.D.C. Feb. 19, 2010) (detailing
the comment of Judge James Robertson).
Status Conf. at 10–12, Garcia v. Veneman, 1:00-cv-02445 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2012) (quoting
government counsel).
See Burger, supra note 415 (illustrating political pressure on Congress and Secretary Vilsack); LaFraniere, supra note 337 (same).
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and calling for equal treatment for Hispanic farmers and ranchers. 431
Hispanic and female farmers sought treatment “on par with other vic432
The Hispanic or Female Farmer’s Claims
tims of discrimination.”
433
Process was reportedly molded at White House meetings over the
strong objections of career lawyers who argued, inter alia, “that the
434
The creation of the Claims
legal risks did not justify the costs.”
Process and the Keepseagle settlement were seen by people in the Administration as “providing ‘a way to neutralize the argument that the
government favors black farmers over Hispanic, Native American or
435
women farmers’” and to court key constituencies.
The Hispanic or Female Farmer’s Claims Process was created by
the executive branch without legislative input or judicial supervision.
436
The Process is a new federal administrative claims program that
gives federal cash benefits to particular individuals. While the President can create commissions to hear claims and disburse money, that
money cannot come from the Judgment Fund unless its statutory re437
It is a close question whether funding the
quirements are met.
Hispanic or Female Farmer’s Claims Process meets the Judgment
Fund’s statutory requirements, given the government’s small litigative
risk and the Process’s inclusion of claimants who had made no claims
438
and were not in touch with the Garcia or Love attorneys.

431

432

433

434
435
436

437

438

Letter from Robert Menendez, Senator, to Barack Obama, President (June 17, 2009),
http://www.menendez.senate.gov/newsroom/press/senators-urge-settlement-in-usdadiscrimination-lawsuit-by-hispanic-farmers (detailing senators’ requests for equal treatment of Hispanic farmers and ranchers).
Ben Evans, USDA Offers $1.3B To Settle Discrimination Complaints from Women, Latino Farmers,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, (May 26, 2010) (quoting attorney for Hispanic farmers),
http://business.gaeatimes.com/2010/05/26/ap-source-usda-offers-13b-to-settlediscrimination-complaints-from-women-latino-farmers-64864/.
See generally LaFraniere, supra note 337 (describing the White House’s involvement in
shaping the claims process); see also Burger, supra note 415, (quoting an Obama administration official who described the White House as playing a “coordinating role”).
See LaFraniere, supra note 337, at 3 (noting lawyers’ objection to the process).
See id. (quoting an administration official).
The parties clearly understood that USDA had created a new program. See e.g., Status
Conf. at 3, 5, 10, 11, 14, Garcia v. Veneman, 1:00-cv-02445 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2012) (colloquy among court and counsel for both sides); Status Conf. at 10–12, Garcia v. Veneman,
1:00-cv-02445 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2012) (government counsel using term “Administrative
Claims Program”).
See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 865,
908 (2007) (explaining that restrictions on use of the Judgment Fund would undercut
any presidentially created causes of action, as “there might be no pot of money from
which to fund damages”).
See supra notes 141–49, 424–29 and accompanying text.
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B. Lack of Transparency
There is little public information about payments from the Judgment Fund or reimbursements to it. There is no readily available way
to find what Judgment Fund payments have been made to a particu439
lar claimant or because of a specific incident. The Bureau of Fiscal
Services, the component of the Department of the Treasury respon440
sible for the Judgment Fund, does provide three categories of information, but each has limited usefulness.
First, pursuant to an Office of Personnel Management regulation,
Fiscal Services publishes an annual No FEAR Non-Compliant Agency
Report identifying agencies that failed to timely reimburse the Judg441
That regulation requires
ment Fund for No FEAR Act payments.
that the record “be eliminated no later than the next annual posting”
442
Little substantive information is provided;
once the agency pays.
the Annual Non-Compliant Agency Report available in May, 2015,
stated in its entirety, “No federal agencies were found to be non443
compliant as of November 1, 2014.”
Second, Fiscal Services also posts on its website the balances currently owed by various agencies to the Judgment Fund for No FEAR
444
Act and Contract Disputes Act reimbursements. The information is
transient. No records are kept or method provided to track agencies
445
Congress is not
that are frequently late in reimbursing the Fund.
446
informed of which agencies fall behind in their CDA payments.
439
440
441

442
443

444

445

See Greene, supra note 9 (noting lack of transparency).
This function was formerly handled by Treasury’s Financial Management Service (FMS).
See Office of Pers. Mgmt. Reimbursement of Judgment Fund, 5 C.F.R. § 724.105 (providing that “[a]n agency’s failure to reimburse the Judgment Fund . . . will be recorded on
an annual basis and posted on the FMS Web site.”); see also 5 C.F.R. § 724.104(b) (providing that agencies are to reimburse the Judgment Fund or “make arrangements in writing
for reimbursement” within forty-five days of receiving notice from FMS). The No FEAR
Non-Compliant Agency Report can be found at http://www.fms.treas.gov/judgefund/
noncompliance.htm.
5 C.F.R. § 724.105.
See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY: BUREAU OF THE FISCAL SERVICE, https://
www.fiscal.treasury.gov/fsservices/gov/pmt/jdgFund/noncompliance.htm (last visited
Sept. 25, 2015) (illustrating a lack of information on non-compliance). On July 11, 2014,
the Treasury’s website provided only the Annual Non-Compliant Agency Report for 2012,
which stated in its entirety, “No federal agencies were found to be non-compliant as of
November 1, 2012.”
See No FEAR Act Receivables, TREASURY DIRECT, http://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/
reports/tma/nofear.htm (providing agency balances); Contract Disputes Receivables,
TREASURY DIRECT, http://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/tma/contractdisputes.
htm (same).
See Sarah Wood Borak, Note, The Legacy of “Deep Throat”: The Disclosure Process of the Whistleblower Protection Act Amendments of 1994 and the No FEAR Act of 2002, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV.
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Finally, Treasury has posted on its website databases containing
some information about Judgment Fund payments. It posted Judgment Fund Transparency Reports to Congress for 2009 through
447
2014. It did so in response to the House managers of the Financial
Services and General Government Appropriations Act of 2012 who
sought public disclosure of information about Judgment Fund payments, including plaintiffs’ names, attorneys’ names, and the facts
448
These Treasury reports are spreadsheets
giving rise to each claim.
showing payments made from the Judgment Fund from October 1 to
September 30 of the year of the report, with columns identifying the
defendant agency, “Plaintiff’s Counsel,” “Payment Amount,” and the
449
principal statutory basis for the claim. Treasury has posted a similar
450
The Judgment Fund Transparency
database for years 2003–2013.
Reports do not include all the information requested by the House
managers, such as the identity of plaintiffs, the facts regarding any
451
claim or, in some instances, the attorneys. Treasury’s reasoning for
withholding names of plaintiffs and some attorneys is reflected in the

446
447

448

449
450

451

617, 654 (2005) (noting that “the [No FEAR] reimbursement process may extend over
several years”).
See GAO-08-295R, supra note 175, at 11 (showing a lack of agency specific information
requirement).
Cong. Report, 2012 Judgment Fund Transparency Report to Cong., BUREAU OF THE
FISCAL SERVICE [hereinafter 2012 Judgment Fund Report]; Cong. Report, 2011 Judgment
Fund Transparency Report to Cong., BUREAU OF THE FISCAL SERVICE, [hereinafter 2011
Judgment Fund Report], http://www.fiscal.treasury.gov/fsservices/gov/pmt/jdgFund/
congress-reports.htm.
See CRS JUDGMENT FUND, supra note 193, at 15 n.130. The managers directed that
[u]nless the disclosure of such information is otherwise prohibited by law or court
order, the report shall consist of: (1) the name of the plaintiff or claimant; (2) the
name of the counsel for the plaintiff or claimant; (3) the name of the agency that
submitted the claim; (4) a brief description of the facts that gave rise to the claim;
and (5) the amount paid representing principal, attorney fees, and interest, if applicable.
H.R. REP. NO. 112-136, at 6 (2011). The same language was used the next year regarding
the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Bill, 2013. H.R. REP. NO.
112-550, at 6 (2012); CRS JUDGMENT FUND, supra note 193, at 15. Similar language was
included in 2013 and 2014, for the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Bills of 2014 and 2015; H.R. REP. NO. 113-172, at 14–15 (2013); H.R. REP. NO.
113-508, at 14 (2014).
E.g., 2011 Judgment Fund Report; 2012 Judgment Fund Report. Other columns include
“Attorney’s Fees Amount,” “Cost Amount,” and “Interest Amount.” Id.
See
JUDGMENT FUND PAYMENT SEARCH PAGE,
https://jfund.fms.treas.gov/
jfradSearchWeb/JFPymtSearchAction.do (providing a database of Judgment Fund payments). The Treasury provides the information explicitly “for the purpose of tracking
the status of approved Judgment Fund payments only.” Id. This database lacks a “Plaintiff’s Counsel” column. Id.
2011 and 2012 Judgment Fund Reports. But see CRS JUDGMENT FUND, supra note 193, at
15 (stating incorrectly that the reports contained all information requested by the House
managers other than fact summaries).
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agency’s denial of a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) appeal
seeking that information. The agency concluded that “disclosing the
names of individuals who received payments from the Judgment
Fund would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal pri452
The agency took a similar position “where the attorney is a
vacy.”
453
sole practitioner and the payment is exclusively for attorney fees.”
In FOIA responses the agency disclosed documents that identified
courts, docket numbers, underlying facts, the names of plaintiffs who
were not individuals, and the law firms and lawyers who were not sole
454
practitioners.
In 1995 Congress repealed the requirement of an annual report
455
No statute now reon the fees and expenses paid under EAJA.
quires agencies or the executive branch to report EAJA payments
456
made in either administrative or judicial proceedings. Consequently, there is data on the amounts paid under that act from 1982 to
457
1994, but a remarkable paucity of information about EAJA pay458
ments made since then. Reports from different agencies about the
459
same EAJA payments may be conflicting. Even when the GAO performed detailed audits of specific agencies it was unable to ascertain
460
all EAJA fees paid on account of those agencies. Its in-depth report
452

453
454
455
456
457

458

459

460

See Letter from Bureau of the Fiscal Service, to Paul Figley, Associate Director, Legal
Rhetoric Program, Washington College of Law (June 18, 2014), 2 (on file with the author) (demonstrating the agency’s refusal to disclose individual payment recipients).
See id. at 3.
See documents released by the Dep’t of Treasury in response to FOIA # 2014-03-086 and
FOIA # 2013-10-20 (on file with the author).
See supra notes 261–62.
See GAO-11-650, supra note 321, at 12 n.21.
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-98-68R, EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT
11–13 (1998) [hereinafter GAO/HEHS 98-68R] (noting that during fiscal years 1982–
1994 there were approximately 8,400 EAJA applications of which 6,200 were granted at a
cost of about $34 million). But see id. at 2 (noting that data from fiscal years 1982–94
could not be verified because government-wide EAJA data was no longer collected and
agency recordkeeping had been lax).
See, e.g., Admin. Conference of the U.S., Report of the Chairman on Agency and Court
Awards in FY 2010 under the Equal Access to Justice Act 5–6 (2013) (noting problems in
acquiring useful data); Baier, supra note 226, at 43 (same); Korpics et al., supra note 229,
at 10998 (same).
See Mortimer & Malmsheimer, supra note 226, at 353–54 (noting disparities in amounts of
reported Forest Service EAJA fees from 1999–2005 in information provided by the Forest
Service ($6,137,583), the Department of Justice ($3,526,632), and the Secretary of Agriculture ($7,002,530)).
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-458T, LIMITED DATA AVAILABLE ON
USDA ATTORNEY FEE CLAIMS AND PAYMENTS 1, 6 (2014) (noting that 29 of 33 USDA
agencies did not track and could not provide relevant data); GAO-11-650 at 2–3, 33 (noting incomplete nature of EPA, Treasury, and DOJ records on costs associated with environmental litigation).
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on USDA and Interior agencies concluded that they had “no way to
readily determine who made claims, the total amount each department paid or awarded in attorney fees, who received the payments, or
461
the statutes under which the cases were brought for the claims.”
Members of both sides in environmental litigation recognize the
462
need for accurate information about EAJA payments.
There is very little public information about outcomes of the Hispanic or Female Farmer’s Claims Process. Unlike Pigford I, Pigford II,
and Keepseagle, no information is available about the number of
claims filed; the total amounts paid on claims, costs, or attorneys’
fees; or how much money remains in the Settlement Fund. The
deadline for filing claims passed on May 1, 2013. While the Framework required the Adjudicator to “[i]ssue periodic reports to USDA
on the progress of the Claims Process and the results of adjudica463
tions,” it did not mandate public reports. None have been made by
the Adjudicator or USDA. USDA has said only that, “As of September
2015, the Claims Administrator has scheduled payments to more than
464
2,500 claimants.”
Keeping Judgment Fund payments secret has adverse consequences. Treasury’s Judgment Fund data cannot be matched with
other agencies’ data because it does not include common identifi465
As a consequence, agencies cannot assess whether proposed
ers.
466
Likewise,
compromises are reasonable compared to similar cases.
the absence of specific information on EAJA payments makes it problematic for Congress to make rational choices about changing that

461

462

463
464

465
466

GAO 12-417R at 5; accord Paul Verkuil, Report of the Chairman on Agency and Court Awards in
FY 2010 under the Equal Access to Justice Act, Admin. Conference of the United States 4–6
(Jan. 9, 2013) (noting the extreme difficulty of collecting data on EAJA payments from
agencies).
See Baier, supra note 226, at 35, 43 (noting problems caused by termination of reporting);
Korpics et al., supra note 229, at 10998 (recognizing that some environmentalists would
support restoration of EAJA reporting requirements).
Framework for Hispanic or Female Farmer’s Claims Process, supra note 421, Sec. IV.
Hispanic and Women Farmers and Ranchers Claims Resolution Process, Home, Update,
https://www.farmerclaims.gov/Default.aspx. If each of the 2,500 claimants received the
maximum $250,000 award, total payments would be $625,000,000. See supra note 419 and
accompanying text. To finance the program, $1,330,000,000 was taken from the Judgment Fund. See supra note 415 and accompanying text. Subtracting the payments from
the corpus leaves at least $705,000,000 of Judgment Fund money unaccounted for. As
with the Keepseagle settlement, less than half the money has gone to pay claims. See supra
note 408 and accompanying text.
See GAO-14-458T, supra note 460, at 10 n.23 (noting problem).
See id. at 9–10 (discussing awards for attorneys’ fees and costs).

Oct. 2015]

THE JUDGMENT FUND

205

statute, 467 and leaves the public in the dark about the size and frequency of substantial government payments and the patterns in
468
The lack of an accessible database of
which they are awarded.
Judgment Fund payments and their recipients makes it difficult to
check whether claimants have previously recovered for the same inju469
ries.
On a broader level, maintaining the fog around Judgment Fund
payments undercuts the transparency that makes for better govern470
As Professor Cass Sunstein observed, “[i]f information is
ment.
kept secret, public deliberation cannot occur; the risks of selfinterested representation and factional tyranny increase dramatical471
No strong governmental interest supports keeping Judgment
ly.”
472
Routine disclosure of Judgment Fund
Fund information secret.
payments would have the benefits of facilitating fact-based “citizen
deliberation” and review of government expenditures; furthering
“checks and balances” by providing specific, detailed information by
which Congress and the public could assess executive branch settlements and judicial branch judgments; and using the disinfecting sunlight of disclosure to discourage payments grounded in “illegitimate
473
or irrelevant considerations.”
The public has a right, grounded in the common law and the First
474
Amendment, to access all final judgments and court decisions.
Treasury’s practice of withholding case names, claimant’s names, and
fact summaries from its Judgment Fund databases makes that infor467

468
469

470

471
472

473
474

See, e.g., Interior FY 2011 Budget Hrg., supra note 322, at 363 (noting, according to Rep.
Simpson, the inability to find any accounting of payments); Korpics et al., supra note 229,
at 10998.
See supra note 462 and accompanying text; see also Baier, supra note 226, at 35 (noting difficulty of assessing “amounts of EAJA awards or the patterns of EAJA use”).
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-69R, CIVIL RIGHTS: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS
IN PIGFORD II CLAIMS PROCESS COULD REDUCE RISK OF IMPROPER DETERMINATION 3
(2012).
See Ross E. Cheit, Tort Litigation, Transparency, and the Public Interest, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS
U. L. REV. 232, 239 (2008) (“[Transparency] inhibits corruption, encourages accountability, and instills public confidence.”).
Cass R. Sunstein, Government Control of Information, 74 CAL. L. REV. 889, 894 (1986).
See id. at 895–96 (noting that secrecy is appropriate to protect military plans, facilitate
negotiations, facilitate internal government deliberations, avoid interest group pressures,
and “encourag[e] communications from others”).
See id. at 896–97 (listing categories of benefits from disclosure).
Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Hidden from the Public by Order of the Court: The Case Against Government-Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. REV. 711, 740 (2004) (citing Nixon v. Warner
Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978)); see also Stephen Wm. Smith, Kudzu in the
Courthouse: Judgments Made in the Shade, 3 FED. CTS. L. REV. 177, 206 (2009) (noting that
that judicial rulings have been open to the public both “at common law, and for most of
this nation’s history”).
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mation difficult to collect in the aggregate, although that information
is readily retrievable on a case by case basis for matters in litigation via
PACER by anyone who knows the parties’ names or the docket num475
Indeed, in response to FOIA requests for information about
ber.
particular items in the annual Judgment Fund databases, Treasury
discloses transmittal documents and court pleadings that contain
docket numbers from which names and details can be obtained with
476
a few mouse clicks. Requiring the public to file a FOIA request to
get a docket number to use in PACER to find a plaintiff’s name or
complaint is akin to making records available only in one remote
477
government file room. This sort of run-around is inconsistent with
the Administration’s Open Government Directive that calls for proactive dissemination of useful information, without “waiting for specific
requests under FOIA,” “online in an open format that can be retrieved, downloaded, indexed, and searched by commonly used web
478
search applications.”
There is even more reason for easy public access when individuals,
groups, or entities receive government funds. The Statement and
Account Clause of the Constitution directs that “a regular Statement
and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money
479
There is a long history of
shall be published from time to time.”
475

476
477

478

479

Public Access to Court Electronic Records (“PACER”) is the federal judiciary’s online
public access system and is available at https://www.pacer.gov. Information pertaining to
administrative settlements is similarly available to the public only when settlements fall
within a judicial process such as court approval of a minor’s settlement.
See supra note 454 and accompanying text.
See Adam Candeub, Transparency in the Administrative State, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 385, 387
(2013) (“‘Transparency’ or ‘access’ does not really exist if obtaining and securing information is costly in either time or effort.”). Professor Candeub notes that the 2013
amendment of the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012 changed the
requirement that information about securities transactions of federal officials be posted
online to a requirement that it be “available on paper but only in the basement of the
Cannon House Office Building.” Id. at 391–92.
Open Government Directive: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Dep’ts and
Agencies from Peter Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. and Budget 2 (Dec. 8, 2009),
http://www.treasury.gov/open/Documents/m10-06.pdf; see also Candeub, supra note
477, at 407 (discussing Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
Cass Sunstein’s call for “agencies to provide information ‘in an open format that enables
the public to download, analyze, and visualize any information and data.’” (citing Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Dep’ts and Agencies from Cass Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Mgmt. and Budget 1 (Apr. 25, 2011))).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. While some courts have held that names of claimants may be
protected from disclosure under FOIA, they have done so without addressing the Statement and Account Clause. See, e.g., News-Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 489 F.3d
1173, 1189, 1196–97, 1199, 1205 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding names of individuals who received disaster assistance could be withheld under FOIA but their addresses must be disclosed, and noting “the release of a list of names and other identifying information does
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disclosure of names and amounts paid to those who sought private
480
bills from Congress. As a matter of policy the Department of Justice
will not agree to settlements or consent decrees that contain confi481
dentiality provisions. While that policy allows rare exceptions, they
“must be considered in the context of the public’s strong interest in
knowing about the conduct of its Government and expenditure of its
482
resources.” There is little reason to keep successful claimants from
being identified as successful claimants. As Judge Joseph F. Anderson
observed in the context of confidentiality provisions, “the desire to
protect someone from relatives, telemarketers, and burglars could also be used to keep secret the names of the winners of state-run lotteries. Yet no one would seriously argue that the names of lottery win483
ners should be shrouded in secrecy enforced by the government.”
IV. POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS IN JUDGMENT FUND PRACTICES
A. Limit Executive Branch Use of the Judgment Fund to Create New Claims
Programs & Processes
The current Judgment Fund regime has worked fairly well. Congress has given the executive branch broad discretion to decide how
to litigate claims, when to appeal, and whether to settle. When cases
or settlements are final, payments are promptly made. There have
been very few controversies.
As a practical matter, there is no effective way for anyone outside
the executive branch to monitor specific litigation decisions or set484
Such matters are
tlements for impropriety or political favoritism.
necessarily complex and confidential. Judges are hardly in a position
to evaluate and report on whether government attorneys are too soft
485
in negotiating a particular settlement or arguing a case. Nor is the
legislative branch well suited to investigate such matters in individual

480
481
482
483
484
485

not inherently . . . constitute a ‘clearly unwarranted’ invasion of personal privacy” (citing
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6))).
See supra notes 244–48 and accompanying text.
28 C.F.R. § 50.23 (“This policy flows from the principle of openness in government . . . .”); see also 28 C.F.R. § 50.9 (“Policy with regard to open judicial proceedings.”).
28 C.F.R. § 50.23; see also Cheit, supra note 468, at 264–65 (noting the need for transparency in government tort settlements).
Anderson, supra note 474, at 740.
See Peterson, supra note 289, at 368 (noting that the Department of Justice “is the only
effective check on itself”).
Id. at 369. But see Cantu, 565 F. App’x at 9–10 (directing court to review whether a settlement offer was tainted by discrimination).
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cases. 486 Indeed, congressional attempts to assess whether specific settlements are too high could draw Congress back into the quagmire of
487
the legislative claims system.
The Administration’s use of the Judgment Fund to create the
Hispanic or Female Farmer’s Claims Process without an appropria488
tion and to enter the Keepseagle settlement does raise other issues.
Should the Judgment Fund be available to fund new administrative
claims programs created by the executive branch without legislation,
489
Should it be
judicial supervision, or congressional supervision?
used to endow huge class settlement systems that may spend more
than half the allotted money on purposes other than compensation
490
of claimants? Congress might consider prohibiting such uses of the
491
If Congress fails to act, it is likely that another
Judgment Fund.
administration will create comparable claims programs or enter similar, open-ended class settlements; it is easier for the executive branch
to act within its arguable discretion than to persuade Congress to appropriate money.
B. Increase Transparency
1. Publish Judgment Fund Payments
Congress should require public disclosure of detailed information
on all Judgment Fund payments. As suggested by the House managers of the Financial Services and General Government Appropria492
tions Acts of 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 and sponsors of the Judg493
Congress should require that
ment Fund Transparency Act,
486
487
488

489
490
491

492
493

See Peterson, supra note 289, at 370–71 (explaining that neither congressional committees
nor the Government Accountability Office would do so effectively).
See supra Parts I.A–C.
See News Transcript, Release No. 0629.10, USDA Office of Communications, Media Conference Call on 2010 Farm Income Forecasts, Trade, Statistics and Final Passage of Pigford II Settlement (Dec. 1, 2010) http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/
usdahome?contentid=2010/12/0629.xml&navid=Recovery_News&edeployment_action
=retrievecontent (Sec. Vilsack explained that unlike in Pigford II, “we don’t have to have
an appropriation from Congress for Garcia/Love”).
See supra notes 424–35 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 402–08 and accompanying text.
Such a limit might provide a new subsection (a)(4) to 31 U.S.C. § 1304, stating, “but, no
payment shall be made on a settlement exceeding $500,000,000 that does not arise from
a single event.”
See supra note 447 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Judgment Fund Transparency Act of 2015, S. 350, 114th Cong. (2015); see also
Government Transparency and Recordkeeping Act of 2012, S. 3415, 112th Congress § 2
(2011–12).

Oct. 2015]

THE JUDGMENT FUND

209

Treasury post annual reports on the internet detailing information
about each Judgment Fund payment. The posted information
should include for each payment the agency involved; the names of
the claimants or plaintiffs and their attorneys; the amount paid, separately listing attorneys’ fees, costs, and interest; a summary of the
facts; and, if the matter was in litigation, the case name, docket num494
ber, and court. This information is readily available; agencies provide it (other than the summary) to Treasury when they submit
495
A one-sentence fact summary
claims or judgments for payment.
could easily be included in the agency submission. Any legislation
should provide that “except with regard to children under eighteen,
the disclosure of information required in this section shall not be
considered a ‘clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy’ for
purposes of Title 5, United States Code.” Such a provision is necessary to insure that Treasury does not withhold this information under
496
FOIA precedents.
2. Restore EAJA Reporting Requirements
Congress should restore the EAJA reporting requirements as sug497
This
gested in the Open Book on Equal Access to Justice Act.
would require the Chairman of the Administrative Conference of the
United States to make an annual report to Congress on EAJA payments and to post online a database containing for each administrative award case names, agencies involved, a description of the claim,
the name of the party who received the award, the amount paid, and
“[t]he basis for the finding that the position of the agency concerned
498
For awards made in litigation the
was not substantially justified.”
bill requires posting of similar information and disclosure of amounts
paid from the Judgment Fund, the amount of attorney fees, and the
499
statute under which suit was filed. Agency heads would be required
500
to provide pertinent information.

494
495

496
497

498
499
500

See generally Judgment Fund Transparency Act of 2015 § 2.
See supra notes 452, 474 and accompanying text; BUREAU OF THE FISCAL SERV., JUDGMENT
FUND CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, http://www.fiscal.treasury.gov/fsservices/gov/pmt/
jdgFund/congress-reports.htm.
See supra notes 453–55 and accompanying text.
Open Book on Equal Access to Justice Act, H.R. 384, 114th Cong. (2015); see also Open
Book on Equal Access to Justice Act, H.R. 2919, 113th Cong. (2014); Open EAJA Act of
2010, H.R. 4717, 111th Cong. (2010).
H.R. 2919 § 2(a).
Id. § 2(b).
Id. § 2(a)–(b).
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3. Publish Reports on CDA and No FEAR Reimbursements
Congress should require annual reports from Treasury that identify month by month information on which agencies were behind on
CDA and No FEAR Act Judgment Fund reimbursement obligations.
The practice of posting current balances is of no use in assessing
which agencies have repeatedly missed payments or whether there is
an ongoing problem with delays. GAO has recommended annual reports to Congress on amounts owed on CDA payments, recognizing
501
that Treasury already supplies that information to OMB. The nowrequired No FEAR Annual Non-Compliant Agency Report provides
502
little information when posted and disappears shortly thereafter.
CONCLUSION
Congress’s power of the purse gives it primary authority over the
payment of claims against the government, but a legislative body is illsuited to decide individual claims. Congress learned that its attempts
to resolve such claims yielded bad results and required more time
and attention than could be rationally spent on the process. Over the
years it made a number of decisions to have claims decided by the
other, better-suited branches of government and to reduce the administrative and procedural burdens of approving, funding, and recording those payments. The cumulative effect of those decisions is
that Congress has lost both control over the payment of claims and
the ability to ascertain what claims have been paid or their source of
payment.
The Judgment Fund functions as Congress intended on individual
judgments and settlements, promptly paying them without unnecessary paperwork or processes. Congressional trust in executive branch
attorneys to protect the Fund seems to be well-founded. The Obama
Administration’s use of the Judgment Fund to finance a new claims
program created without congressional approval or oversight, however, opens a different chapter. If Congress does not act to limit such
uses, it is fair to anticipate that similar claims programs will be created without congressional input and funded by the Judgment Fund.
Congressional decisions to cut back on requirements for reports
and publication of government payments were made before wide501
502

See GAO-08-295R, supra note 175, at 11.
See supra notes 441–43 and accompanying text; BUREAU OF THE FISCAL SERV., ANNUAL
NON-COMPLIANT AGENCY REPORT, http://www.fiscal.treasury.gov/fsservices/gov/pmt/
jdgFund/noncompliance.htm.
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spread use of the internet. Online publication of readily available information about Judgment Fund payments would be relatively simple
and inexpensive. That publication would serve the public interest by
increasing the transparency of government payments to particular
claimants and by providing information that Congress and the public
could use to assess if the claims system is working as it should, and
whether legislative changes should be made.

